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Over the past decade, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and states have developed environmental leadership programs (ELPs), a type 
of voluntary environmental program designed to recognize facilities with 
strong environmental performance records and encourage all facilities to 
perform better. Proponents argue that ELPs overcome some of the limitations 
of traditional environmental regulation by encouraging managers to address 
the full gambit of environmental problems posed by their facilities, reducing the 
costs of environmental regulation, easing adversarialism, and fostering positive 
culture change. Although ELPs have been in place for much of the last decade 
at the federal and state level, these programs have been subject to little 
empirical evaluation. In this Article, we chart a course for assessing whether 
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ELPs achieve their goals. Drawing on archival research and interviews with 
government officials who manage these programs, we provide the first 
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of these programs, describing 
program goals, activities, communication strategies, and data collection 
practices. We find that EPA and many states have established ELPs to improve 
the environment and to achieve various social goals such as improving 
relationships between business and government. When it comes to collecting 
data that could be used to assess these programs’ successes, however, 
government efforts fall short. Even when agencies collect reliable data, these 
data usually cannot be aggregated sensibly and are insufficient to draw 
inferences about the true impact of these programs. They also cannot help 
answer the question of whether ELPs are actually prompting pollution 
reductions or improving regulatory relationships. These general data 
weaknesses are significant, even surprising, given the aspirations for ELPs to 
facilitate policy learning and advocates’ claims that these programs are 
delivering important environmental benefits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of an extensive environmental regulatory system over the last 
several decades has corresponded with a period of substantial improvement in 
overall environmental quality in the United States.1 Increasingly, however, the 
U.S. environmental regulatory system has elicited criticisms for a number of 
purported failings. Some longstanding environmental problems targeted by 
regulation continue to persist, such as smog, while new problems, such as 
global climate change, raise growing, serious concerns.2 In addition, many 
observers perceive that the current system is excessively costly, rigid, and 
adversarial.3 Others argue that existing environmental policy fails to motivate 
firms to find new ways to improve their environmental performance, and that it 
provides too few incentives for innovations in resource consumption and end-
of-life product disposal that could yield substantial environmental benefits.4 As 
a practical matter, the existing system may simply be too large to manage. For 
example, nearly 400,000 facilities in the United States are subject to hazardous 
waste permitting rules and more than 150,000 require air permits.5 
In response to the limitations and challenges of traditional environmental 
regulation, federal and state environmental agencies are experimenting with 
voluntary programs as tools to achieve overarching environmental policy 
goals.6 The term “voluntary program” encompasses a range of meanings. It can 
 
 1. J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998). 
 2. Regulations to control ground-level ozone (or “smog”) have been in place for more than three 
decades, yet in 2006 approximately 77 million people lived in areas where ozone levels exceed current 
national ambient air quality standards. EPA, PUB. NO. EPA/600/R-07/045F, EPA’S 2008 REPORT ON 
THE ENVIRONMENT 2-22 to 2-23(2008), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm? 
deid=190806. Emissions of carbon dioxide, a primary gas contributing to global warming, have yet to be 
controlled through national legislation; not surprisingly, CO2 emissions increased by 20 percent in the 
period 1990 to 2005. Id. at 2-65. See also THE HEINZ CENTER, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS 2008 1,3 (2008), available at http://heinzhome.heinzctrinfo.net/ecosystems/ 
2008report/pdf_files/Key_Findings_Fact_Sheet.pdf (detailing as key findings from the report’s section 
on water quality that “contaminants were detected in virtually all streams” and in 80 percent of 
freshwater fish tested; also noting that “one-third of U.S. native plant and animal species are at risk of 
extinction”). 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in 
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1–3 (Marian R. 
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); NEIL GUNNINGHAM, PETER GRABOWSKY, & DARREN SINCLAIR, 
SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 6 (1998); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive 
Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1995); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of 
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21 (2001). 
 4. See DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 81 (2006) (arguing that 
traditional environmental regulation “[i]s [i]rrelevant to [m]any [p]roblems and [t]hus [i]neffective”). 
 5. EPA, Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO), http://www.epa-echo.gov/ 
echo/compliance_report.html (select either “Must Have RCRA ID#” or “Must Have Air Permit” and 
click “Search”) (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 6. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 2007-P-00003, EVALUATION 
REPORT: PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS MAY EXPAND EPA’S INFLUENCE (2006) (noting that voluntary 
programs may increase the number of participants addressing environmental issues in ways that go 
beyond regulatory compliance); FIORINO, supra note 4 (arguing in favor of voluntary programs as part 
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mean private sector programs designed to improve environmental performance 
beyond what regulations require or in areas not addressed by regulation at all.7 
It can also refer to nonmandatory, government-sponsored initiatives seeking to 
encourage facilities to go beyond compliance. At the federal level, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established dozens of voluntary 
programs “designed to motivate people and organizations to take actions, not 
required by regulation, that benefit the environment.”8 
This Article reports findings from an empirical study of a certain kind of 
voluntary program which EPA and states call environmental leadership 
programs (ELPs).9 ELPs are voluntary partnerships between regulatory 
agencies and private-sector facilities.10 The government sets the terms of these 
partnerships, establishing specific criteria that facilities must meet to qualify for 
membership in the partnership program. Businesses that are interested in 
 
of a redesigned environmental policy approach); REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF 
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN (Richard D. 
Morgenstern & William A. Pizer eds., 2007). 
 7. See, e.g., ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: 
GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 82–92 (2006) (describing 
ISO 14001, the international environmental management system standard that is an example of a 
privately initiated voluntary program). See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based 
Strategies: An Emerging Approach to Environmental Protection, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 3, 13–14 (Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006). 
 8. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 2007-P-00041, EVALUATION REPORT: 
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC 
MANAGEMENT APPROACH 4 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/20070925-2007-
P-00041.pdf (quoting EPA, CHARTER FOR COORDINATING AND MANAGING EPA’S VOLUNTARY 
PROGRAMS (2004)). These government initiatives fall into five general types: educational, financial 
assistance, recognition, product certification, or partnerships. CARY COGLIANESE & JENNIFER NASH, 
BEYOND COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS DECISION MAKING AND THE US EPA’S PERFORMANCE TRACK 
PROGRAM 107 (2006) [hereinafter BEYOND COMPLIANCE]. 
 9. See, e.g., Mark Stoughton & Elizabeth Levy, Voluntary Facility-level Sustainability 
Performance Reporting: Current Status, Relationship to Organization-level Reporting, and Principles 
for Progress, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 266 n.5, 269 n.10 (2004) (giving examples of environmental 
leadership programs, ways in which members participate, and benefits of participation); George B. 
Wyeth, “Standard” and “Alternative” Environmental Protection: The Changing Role of Environmental 
Agencies, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 5, 41–43 (2006) (describing features of leadership 
programs). These programs are also sometimes called performance-based environmental programs or 
performance tracking programs. To the extent that these alternative terms connote that these programs 
require businesses to achieve any specified level of environmental performance, they are a misnomer. 
Even the label “leadership” could be misleading if taken to mean that members of these programs 
necessarily have achieved levels of environmental performance superior to their industry peers. For our 
purposes, we use the leadership label simply as a concise way to refer to programs exhibiting the kinds 
of characteristics discussed in the text. 
 10. Government organizations also participate in many of these programs. For example, about 15 
percent of the members of EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track are government facilities. 
Private, not-for-profit organizations also participate: about 3.5 percent of EPA’s Performance Track 
program report “research and education” as their primary activity. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., 
MULTIPLE SECTOR ANALYSIS (unpublished spreadsheet, on file with authors). Due to the fact that most 
members are business entities, for the ease of our readers we use terms such as “private-sector facilities” 
and “businesses” to refer to the members of ELPs. 
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participating in ELPs apply for membership, and the government, acting a bit 
like a prestigious college’s admissions office, decides which businesses can 
join the ELP and receive the benefits bestowed upon its members.11 
ELPs share a common set of entry criteria and membership 
requirements.12 To participate in most such programs, facilities must comply 
with existing environmental regulations—but compliance alone is not 
sufficient. ELPs call on facilities to set environmental performance targets that 
go beyond regulatory requirements. They also call on facilities to make 
commitments in areas that environmental regulations have not yet addressed, 
such as energy use, water use, the quantity of solid waste generated, and habitat 
loss. Businesses must report to agencies on a regular basis on their progress in 
meeting their commitments, and in some cases they must share performance 
information with surrounding communities as well. Most ELPs require 
facilities to implement some form of environmental management system 
(EMS), and some require that facilities receive external certification that their 
EMSs meet prevailing standards.13 In return for meeting these requirements, 
agencies recognize members and occasionally offer additional benefits, such as 
regulatory flexibility or less frequent inspections. 
EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, established in 2000, 
exemplifies the ELP approach.14 Over five hundred facilities belong to this 
national program that “recognizes and rewards” businesses meeting specific 
membership requirements established by the agency.15 Member facilities must 
have a demonstrated record of complying with environmental laws, a 
commitment to go beyond compliance with these laws, an independently 
certified EMS, and a pattern of outreach to their local communities. In return, 
EPA provides these facilities with positive publicity, opportunities for 
networking with agency officials and business leaders, and certain types of 
relief from regulatory and administrative burdens.16 Performance Track is 
 
 11. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 137–138, 145–146, 171–73; PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, 
at 54–57, 62–67. 
 12. See infra Part II.B.–C. for more detailed descriptions of the criteria mentioned in this 
paragraph. 
 13. See infra Part I.A. for a more extensive description of EMSs. 
 14. See, e.g., EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Performance Track, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/ 
performancetrack/about.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). For a more detailed description of 
Performance Track, see Appendix I. 
 15. EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Performance Track, Members, https://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/ptrack.nsf/ 
faMembers?readform (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 16. For example, EPA deems Performance Track facilities to be a low priority for routine EPA 
inspections. See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement & 
Compliance Assurance, EPA & Richard T. Farrell, Assoc. Adm’r, Office of Policy, Econ. & Innovation, 
EPA to EPA Adm’r et al. 3 (Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/ 
downloads/PTComplianceEnforcement.pdf. In addition, Performance Track members that are large-
quantity generators of hazardous waste may accumulate such waste on-site for up to two times—and in 
some cases even three times—the normally allowable time periods. EPA Standards Applicable to 
Generators of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(a), (j)(1) (2006). See also EPA Standards for 
Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 40 C.F.R. §§ 
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hardly alone; over the last decade, twenty-two states have created programs that 
share many of the same features as Performance Track.17 According to EPA, 
“Performance Track and its state counterparts aim to transform the way that 
government and industry address environmental issues and solve problems.”18 
ELPs have won considerable support from government officials, business 
leaders, and scholars.19 Former EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson declared 
that Performance Track “has proven to be an important catalyst for helping 
EPA change the way businesses look at their role in environmental protection” 
and that it is “delivering impressive environmental results.”20 Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government recognized both 
Performance Track and the Wisconsin Green Tier program, a state-run ELP, as 
 
264.15(b)(4), 264.174, 264.195(b)–(e), 264.1101(c)(4), 265.15(b)(4), 265.174, 265.195(a)–(d), 
265.201(c)–(e), 265.1101(c)(4) (2006) (allowing Performance Track members to reduce inspection 
frequencies from the normal daily or weekly schedule to a monthly schedule with respect to containers, 
tank systems, containment buildings, and areas subject to spills). 
 17. Industrial Economics, Inc., provided us with a list of state ELPs currently in operation. The list 
included basic information about each program including the program’s name, start date, and number of 
members. For a description of each state program, see EPA, STATE PERFORMANCE-BASED PROGRAM 
DIRECTORY (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/partners/StateProgramsDirectory 
Final-May2007.pdf. Several of these state programs were actually established before EPA created its 
Performance Track. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 172. 
 18. OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, EPA, PUB NO. 100-R-07-004, PERFORMANCE 
TRACK FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 31 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/ 
downloads/PTPRreport_05final.pdf. Some states have sought increased support from EPA for their 
programs. For example, a report prepared by representatives from several states asserted that “[e]fforts 
are needed to align the EPA-state relationship to recognize and support performance-based programs 
and to reduce transaction costs associated with program implementation.” ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE 
STATES, SURVEY OF STATE SUPPORT FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS 7 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
performancetrack/downloads/ECOS_Report_Final_01-13-05.pdf. EPA and states work closely to 
implement their respective ELPs, exchanging information in monthly conference calls and, in some 
cases, signing memoranda of understanding that document their intention to cooperate. EPA, Nat’l 
Envtl. Performance Track, State Programs, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/partners/linkage.htm 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 19. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 4, at 149 (noting that recent EPA Administrators Whitman, 
Leavitt, and Johnson have strongly endorsed Performance Track); EPA, WHAT MEMBERS HAVE TO SAY 
ABOUT PERFORMANCE TRACK (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/downloads/ 
MemberTestimonials3_06.pdf (providing testimonials for Performance Track from over ten industry 
representatives); Marc Allen Eisner, Corporate Environmentalism, Regulatory Reform, and Industry 
Self-Regulation: Toward Genuine Regulatory Reinvention in the United States, 17 GOVERNANCE 145, 
155 (2004) (noting that “if properly designed and implemented one would expect that this experiment 
could produce some positive results” and could help “provide a context for innovations that could be 
disseminated across the corporate economy”); Dennis D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Law 
and Policy and the Flexible Production Economy, 79 IND. L.J. 611, 646 (2004) (suggesting “that 
Oregon’s performance track program is functioning as a bridge between the environmental regulatory 
system and a new form of industrial production”); Alfred R. Light, Environmental Federalism in the 
United States and the European Union: A Harmonic Convergence?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 321, 341 
(2002) (characterizing EPA’s Performance Track as “[a] symbol of the new ‘second generation’ 
approach” to environmental policy). 
 20. Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Adm’r, Remarks at the National Environmental Performance Track 
Awards Dinner (May 9, 2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ 
a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/d38cc2f12730a7188525716c006f0388!OpenDocument. 
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among the nation’s most noteworthy governmental innovations.21 Wisconsin 
Governor Jim Doyle described his state’s Green Tier program as “essential to 
demonstrating that environmental results and economic gains can be achieved 
together.”22 
Not all reviews of ELPs have been positive, however. Some 
environmental advocacy organizations have opposed EPA and state plans to 
expand ELPs, arguing that claims about these programs’ environmental 
benefits have been exaggerated.23 EPA’s Inspector General has raised questions 
about whether Performance Track is achieving its goals24 and members of 
Congress have asked whether money spent on Performance Track might be 
better used to support traditional regulatory programs.25 
 
 21. Press Release, EPA, Three EPA Programs Nominated for Government ‘Oscars’ (Mar. 30, 
2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/68b5f2d54f3eefd28525701500517fbf/ 
09d2dfd224b8298f852571410059871a!OpenDocument; News Release, Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., 
Wisconsin’s Green Tier Program finalist for Harvard Innovation Award 1 (May 4, 2006), available at 
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/cea/environmental/media/pressreleases/20060504pressrelease.pdf. 
 22. News Release, Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., supra note 21, at 1. 
 23. In 2005, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) submitted to EPA a fourteen-page 
letter criticizing EPA’s and states’ “fixation” with developing incentives to boost facilities’ participation 
in ELPs and satisfying self-serving agendas: “[T]here is scant attention and detail concerning actual 
superior environmental performance—for example, verifying and quantifying the results under 
programs to date; comparing those results to results under core environmental programs and evaluating 
the trade-offs; and analyzing the roles of inspections, enforcement, audits, EMSs and innovations in 
actually achieving superior performance. For all the talk of ‘performance’ based programs, there is 
alarmingly little discussion and evidence of actual superior environmental performance or demonstrated 
performance that goes beyond compliance.” Letter from John Walke, Clean Air Dir., Natural Res. 
Defense Council, to Office of the Adm’r, Docket ID OA-2005-0003, EPA 1–2 (Nov. 3, 2005), available 
at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064800ad650&disposition= 
attachment&contentType=pdf. In 2006, the Environmental Integrity Project issued a report charging that 
some Performance Track members increased emissions of toxic pollutants after joining the program. 
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, WRONG TRACK? SOME PERFORMANCE TRACK FACILITIES REPORT 
INCREASED LEVELS OF TOXIC POLLUTION 1 (2006), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/ 
pubs/performance%20track%20report_feb06.pdf. The report concluded that “Performance Track offers 
self-policing in its most extreme form, as participants get to pick their subjects, design their own tests, 
grade themselves, and even change their report cards after the fact to avoid a failing grade.” Id. at 3. 
 24. In 2007, EPA’s Office of Inspector General (IG) “found that Performance Track did not have 
clear plans that connected activities with its goals, and did not have performance measures that show if it 
achieves anticipated results.” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 2007-P-00013, EVALUATION 
REPORT: PERFORMANCE TRACK COULD IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE 
VALUE At a Glance (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/20070329-2007-P-
00013.pdf. In its response to the Inspector General’s report, EPA’s Office of Policy, Economics, and 
Innovation noted that Performance Track encourages facilities to “aim high” and set goals “that present 
a challenge.” Id. at 36. A purpose of the program is to encourage innovation, and Performance Track 
program managers understand that meeting ambitious goals may not always be possible. The program 
does now expect members to make progress toward achieving two or three of their goals to have their 
memberships renewed. Id. at 30. 
 25. See Letter from the Hon. Albert R. Wynn, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Environment 
and Hazardous Materials, and the Hon. Bart Stupak, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, to the Hon. Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA 2 (Apr. 13, 2007) (noting that legislators 
“are concerned about taxpayer dollars being wisely used at a time when EPA’s core environmental and 
public health programs, ones that are specifically authorized by Congress, are severely underfunded.”). 
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ELPs have now matured into established programs. ELPs in seventeen 
states have been in place for five years or more, and eight have recently or will 
soon mark their ten-year anniversaries.26 Given that these programs have 
achieved prominence as tools of environmental policy, formal evaluation and 
analysis of their effectiveness is appropriate. The data ELPs have been 
collecting about their members’ activities over the years might now be useful in 
evaluating the extent to which these programs succeed in improving the United 
States’ environmental protection system as well as for understanding how 
government can communicate with the public regarding any successes these 
programs have achieved. After all, one of the purported benefits of ELPs is that 
they can enhance information available to regulators and the public.27 
Despite their widespread adoption and relative longevity, ELPs have yet to 
be subject to any formal empirical evaluation. To date, scholarly work has 
mainly just described the design of a few of these programs or considered why 
certain businesses participate in them.28 For example, one of the first academic 
discussions of ELPs consisted of two state program case studies: Wisconsin’s 
Environmental Cooperation Pilot Program (a predecessor to the state’s Green 
Tier program) and Oregon’s Green Permits program.29 A subsequent study 
summarized the features of ELPs in six additional states, raising questions 
about these programs’ membership criteria.30 A related study considered 
 
 26. As noted supra note 17, we have relied primarily on a list of ELPs provided to us by Industrial 
Economics, Inc., in identifying state programs. 
 27. See, e.g., David Monsma, Sustainable Development and the Global Economy: New Systems in 
Environmental Management, 24 VT. L. REV. 1245 (2000) (“Measuring, reporting, and knowing the 
environmental performance levels of an operation in near real-time is what the regulator and public want 
and need to know. Overall, if a performance track is put in place, it would produce more complete and 
accurate information . . . .”); FIORINO, supra note 4, at 148 (explaining that Performance Track’s “goal 
is . . . to improve the ability of government and firms to measure performance”). 
 28. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 4, at 123–26; Stoughton & Levy, supra note 9, at 266 n.5, 269 
n.10; 41–43; Wyeth, supra note 9, at 41–43; MARC ALLEN EISNER, GOVERNING THE ENVIRONMENT: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 177–96 (2007). The EPA’s IG conducted an 
internal review of the federal Performance Track; this report, which could be considered an “evaluation” 
in a certain sense, does not purport to meet the standards for a systematic empirical evaluation seeking to 
identify the impacts the program has caused in environmental quality. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
supra note 24. The authors of this Article have also been studying empirically why businesses join 
ELPs; however, even this work does not represent an evaluation of the impact of ELPs on firms’ 
environmental outputs or other performance metrics. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, EPA’s 
National Environmental Performance Track: What Is It Tracking? What Role Is It Performing?, 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Government 
Clubs: Theory and Evidence from Voluntary Environmental Programs, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A 
CLUB THEORY APPROACH (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., forthcoming 2008). 
 29. JERRY SPEIR, GREEN PERMITS AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A REPORT 
ON REGULATORY INNOVATION PROGRAMS IN OREGON AND WISCONSIN 5 (2000), available at 
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/epafile04.pdf. Both programs were created by state 
statutes granting environmental regulators flexibility in issuing permits to program members. See id. at 
7–8. 
 30. Jerry Speir, EMSs and Tiered Regulation: Getting the Deal Right, in REGULATING FROM THE 
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 198, 205–12 (Cary 
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). Speir’s review questioned whether EMS adoption was a 
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reasons for the slow membership growth experienced by many state ELPs, 
ultimately recommending that program designers pay greater attention to 
defining environmental “leadership,” offering adequate incentives, and 
establishing effective approaches to measurement and evaluation.31 
No one has yet attempted, however, to use the information ELPs collect 
about members’ environmental activities and accomplishments to evaluate 
these programs formally. The National Research Council, EPA’s Office of 
Inspector General, and academics32 have all called for careful review of the 
role of voluntary environmental programs.33 To their credit, researchers have 
produced a steadily growing number of studies on other types of voluntary 
environmental programs—though not on environmental leadership programs.34 
 
sufficient indicator of sound environmental performance to form the basis for a membership criterion in 
state programs and argued that preferential treatment should instead be triggered by “a system of 
information based on performance indicators” that states were “only beginning to build.” Id. at 217. 
 31. Michael Crow, Beyond Experiments, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, May–June 2000, at 20. 
 32. See, e.g., Kathryn Harrison, Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to 
Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 51 (1999); Daniel Press & Daniel A. Mazmanian, The 
Greening of Industry: Combining Government Regulation and Voluntary Strategies, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Norman J. Vig & 
Michael E. Kraft eds., 2006); Cary Coglianese & Lori D. Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of 
Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 246, 260 (Garry D. Brewer 
& Paul C. Stern eds., 2005). 
 33. Comm. on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, Ctr. for Governance, Econ., & Int’l 
Studies, Div. of Behavioral & Soc. Scis. & Educ., Nat’l Research Council, Decision-Relevant Science 
for Evidence-Based Environmental Policy, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 85, 98–100 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005); 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 1; EPA, EVALUATION REPORT: PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 
MAY EXPAND EPA’S INFLUENCE (Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 2007-P-00003, 2006); 
EPA, VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC 
MANAGEMENT APPROACH  (Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 2007-P-00041, 2007). 
 34. See, e.g., Kathleen Segerson & Thomas J. Miceli, Voluntary Environmental Agreements: 
Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1998); Madhu 
Khanna & Lisa A. Damon, EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic 
Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1999); Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory 
Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 291 (2001); ALFRED A. MARCUS, 
DONALD A. GEFFEN, & KEN SEXTON, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM 
PROJECT XL (2002); Jennifer Nash, Tiered Environmental Regulation: Lessons from the StarTrack 
Program, in INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE (Theo de Bruijn & Vicki Norberg-Bohm eds., 2005); Matthew Potoski & Aseem 
Prakash, Covenants with Weak Swords: ISO 14001 and Facilities’ Environmental Performance 24 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 745 (2005); Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, Did the EPA’s Voluntary Industrial 
Toxics Program Reduce Emissions? A GIS Analysis of Distributional Impacts and By-Media Analysis of 
Substitution, 52 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 391 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, The Promise and Limits of 
Voluntary Management-Based Regulatory Reform: An Analysis of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program, in 
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 167 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006); Jorge Rivera, 
Peter de Leon, & Charles Koerber, Is Greener Whiter Yet? The Sustainable Slopes Program After Five 
Years, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 195 (2006). For a detailed review of the literature on voluntary programs, see 
JENNIFER NASH & TIM LARSON, PERFORMANCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS: LITERATURE 
REVIEW (2007) (on file with authors). 
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This gap is all the more surprising because ELPs appear to be rich with data. 
Many ELPs require facilities to submit annual reports about their activities as a 
condition of membership. EPA and several states use the data they collect to 
showcase individual members’ accomplishments and to make statements about 
the overall environmental benefits of the programs. Yet, to our knowledge, 
neither government analysts nor academic researchers have sought to make use 
of these data to assess systematically ELPs’ impacts on their objectives. 
This Article makes a crucial step toward filling this gap by providing a 
means for assessing whether environmental leadership programs achieve their 
goals. Are they a positive force for change? Or do they instead represent 
symbolic gestures that divert resources from more effective solutions to today’s 
environmental problems? Drawing on archival research and interviews with 
government officials who manage these programs, we provide the first 
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of Performance Track and the 
seventeen oldest state environmental leadership programs. 
After summarizing the primary benefits that policy makers and scholars 
attribute to ELPs, our analysis proceeds in four parts. We first present 
information about ELP goals. After all, ELP results should be evaluated in the 
context of what these programs set out to do. Second, we consider the activities 
required of facilities to join ELPs and remain members in good standing, as 
well as activities undertaken by government under the auspices of ELPs. If 
programs are effective, we would expect to see a clear, logical connection 
between ELP goals and these activities. Third, we describe in detail how 
agencies have communicated with the regulated community and the broader 
public about their ELPs. Effective communication is especially important to 
program success since facilities, elected officials, and community organizations 
are unlikely to participate in, or support, programs with which they are 
unfamiliar. Finally, we consider the information that agencies collect about 
ELP results. Ideally, this information should be relevant to program goals, of 
high quality, suitable for drawing conclusions about overall program 
effectiveness, and publicly accessible. Such data are not only essential for 
program evaluation, but also for meeting ELP proponents’ aspirations for 
policy learning.35 
Our analysis lays the foundation for any future evaluation of ELPs. We 
encourage researchers to build on this foundation by undertaking full-fledged 
evaluations of these programs. We highlight some of the challenges associated 
with such evaluations, particularly with respect to data collection. As we will 
show, despite ELPs various reporting requirements, agencies do not collect all 
the information needed to determine whether ELPs are effective. This 
shortcoming is particularly disappointing given that agencies have looked to 
ELPs as vehicles for policy learning. 
 
 35. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 148–49, 163–65, 223 (emphasizing the important contributions 
performance tracking programs can make to policy learning). 
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I. BRINGING DATA TO BEAR ON ELPS’ POTENTIAL 
In launching Performance Track in 2000, then-EPA Administrator Carol 
Browner emphasized that the program “breaks with the past” approach to 
environmental policy and “will bring cleaner, cheaper and smarter results.”36 A 
growing number of supporters argue that ELPs, whether state or federal, can 
overcome major limitations of the current regulatory approach to 
environmental protection and forge the way to a new system of environmental 
policy.37 As noted, the existing system is said to be too costly, inflexible, and 
narrowly focused on controlling fewer, older environmental problems to the 
detriment of addressing newer problems or larger ecosystem impacts.38 In this 
Part, we begin by elaborating four benefits that policy makers and scholars 
suggest ELPs may offer in terms of overcoming limitations of existing 
environmental law. As compared to traditional state and federal environmental 
programs, ELPs may allow agencies to address a wider array of environmental 
problems, achieve environmental benefits at lower cost, reduce adversarialism, 
and encourage positive culture change. After summarizing these potential 
benefits, we then explain our research strategy for assessing the goals, 
activities, communication practices, and information collection strategies of 
eighteen of the most established ELPs. 
A. Potential Benefits of ELPs 
Nearly all ELPs require or encourage facilities to implement 
environmental management systems (EMSs). Given that EMSs are designed to 
contribute to each of the four potential ELP benefits outlined above, their role 
merits a detailed elaboration. EMSs constitute internal efforts by facility and 
corporate level managers to set and meet environmental targets to address the 
gamut of both regulated and unregulated environmental impacts caused by their 
facilities Typically, EMSs adhere to what is commonly referred to as the “plan-
do-check-act” model—where managers develop plans, assign responsibility for 
implementing the plans, track progress, and adjust and improve the entire 
system as necessary.39 In recent years, some managers have chosen to 
implement EMSs that meet external standards such as those embodied in ISO 
14001, a set of nongovernmental, international standards that specify generic 
 
 36. Carol M. Browner, EPA Adm’r, Remarks Delivered at the Performance Track Launch (June 
26, 2000), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d41dcc0e24d31638852572a00065 
af98/9bfa2a1fa3765d998525701a0052e332!OpenDocument. 
 37. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 173 (“Performance tracking programs stretch the model of the old 
regulation . . . . [They] are designed to change the regulatory system.”). See also sources cited supra 
note 19. 
 38. See, e.g., Esty & Chertow, supra note 3, at 1–3; DAVIES & MAZUREK supra note 1, at 269–87. 
 39. See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New 
Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1, 2 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
3 COGLIANESE 2/12/2009  11:51:12 AM 
782 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35:771 
requirements for each of the four EMS elements.40 Some managers also hire 
third party auditors to certify that their EMSs are consistent with the ISO 14001 
standard.41 
ELPs’ first purported benefit is their potential for spurring facilities to 
address a broad range of pressing environmental problems, including those that 
are currently subject to regulation (such as emissions of volatile organic 
compounds) and those that are not (such as water and energy consumption). By 
encouraging facilities to implement EMSs, ELPs may help set in motion 
internal processes by which managers identify their businesses’ significant 
environmental impacts, make commitments for reducing them, and monitor 
progress toward achieving those commitments. Those processes of planning, 
doing, checking, and acting are designed to endure beyond the tenure of any 
one employee, becoming embedded in everyday routines even as personnel and 
production processes change.42 
Although ELPs have the potential to change the environmental 
performance of facilities that sign up as members, these programs also may 
strengthen environmental practices generally, even among facilities that do not 
join. According to EPA, ELPs have the potential to “improve [environmental] 
capabilities across the board,”—among not only “top performers” but also 
“mainstreamers” and “laggards.”43 EPA calls this phenomenon “shifting the 
curve toward better performance.”44 ELPs could shift the environmental 
performance curve if “mainstreamers” or “laggards” tried to meet ELP entry 
requirements to receive the benefits agencies bestow upon ELP members. 
Today, many private sector managers seek to establish strong environmental 
credentials to appeal to customers, improve their standing with regulators, 
reduce risks, and attract investors.45 If facilities and agencies came to view ELP 
entry criteria as norms for exemplary environmental performance, these 
 
 40. “ISO” is the common abbreviation for the International Organization for Standardization, a 
transnational organization comprised of representatives from various private and public sector standard-
setting organizations.  See PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 83–84. 
 41. See PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 92–96. The number of U.S. facilities attaining ISO 
14001 certification, as established by a registered third party, reached 5,585 by the end of December 
2006. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, THE ISO SURVEY OF CERTIFICATIONS: 2006 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/survey2006.pdf. 
 42. Coglianese & Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, supra 
note 39, at 1, 11–12. 
 43. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE: ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE 
STEWARDSHIP AND ACCELERATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, REPORT OF THE EPA INNOVATIONS 
TASK FORCE 6 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/epainnov/pdf/report99.pdf. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. FOREST L. REINHARDT, DOWN TO EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 9–13 (2000). 
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programs might influence the practices of even those firms that had no interest 
in becoming members.46 
ELPs’ second potential benefit is their ability to achieve environmental 
gains at a lower cost than traditional regulation. Critics of the current regulatory 
system accuse it of being grossly inefficient, requiring government to enforce 
arbitrary, uniform rules that compel firms to invest in expensive technologies 
and time-consuming paperwork, often contributing little to environmental 
quality.47 ELPs seek to overcome the costliness of environmental regulation by 
offering discrete forms of regulatory flexibility to participating businesses.48 
Through ELPs, EPA and some of the states have taken steps to reduce the 
paperwork burdens associated with regulatory compliance, to lessen the 
probability that participating facilities will be subjected to government 
inspections, and to enhance the flexibility of methods used to comply with 
environmental performance requirements.49 In addition to lowering 
bureaucratic costs, ELPs encourage businesses to pursue cost-saving strategies, 
such as energy and water conservation.50 
ELPs’ third purported benefit lies in their potential for overcoming the 
adversarialism that many observers find too often surrounds traditional 
environmental regulation.51 Instead of policies that pit businesses against 
government, environmental groups, and local communities, ELPs seek to forge 
 
 46. See ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, FROM HERESY TO DOGMA: AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM 40–41 (1997) (discussing how external pressures may shape a firm’s 
internal norms and culture). 
 47. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 46. 
 48. Browner, supra note 36 (promising that “costs will be lower” and “administrative operations 
will be streamlined” for businesses that join Performance Track). 
 49. See, e.g., EPA, MACT INCENTIVE FACT SHEET 1 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
performancetrack/benefits/regadmin/mact_factsheet.pdf (describing some benefits to Performance Track 
members including “low inspection priority, . . . regulatory and administrative flexibility,” and 
incentives for “reporting reductions”); VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, POLLUTION PREVENTION 2005 
4–5 (2005), available at http://www.deq.virginia.gov/p2/pdf/report05.pdf (explaining the types of 
“alternative compliance methods” available to certain program participants); Memorandum from John 
Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA & Jessica L. 
Furey, Assoc. Adm’r, Office of Policy, Econ., & Innovation, EPA, to EPA Reg’l Adm’rs et al. 2 (Oct. 
29, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/benefits/oeca.pdf (reaffirming EPA’s 
commitment to treat “Performance Track facilities . . . as a low priority for routine inspections”); Tex. 
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, Clean Texas Benefits, http://cleantexas.org/docs/CT%20benefits% 
20summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (listing benefits to members such as “[r]educed reporting,” 
“[r]educed state inspection frequency,” and “[e]xpedited . . . review of state permits”). 
 50. In many cases, performance commitments that managers choose as part of their ELP 
memberships result in cost savings. For example, of the 1,170 commitments made by members of EPA’s 
Performance Track program in 2005, 154 (13%) were to reduce water use, 187 (16%) were to reduce 
energy use, 223 (19%) were to reduce non-hazardous waste generation, and 129 (11%) were to reduce 
hazardous waste generation. OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 9. In addition 
to improving environmental quality, delivering on these commitments can save facilities money. Id. at 
12–13. 
 51. See generally Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991) (discussing adversarial qualities of the American legal system and their 
costs). 
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partnerships, foster cooperation, and build trust among these varied actors.52 
Government regulators use ELPs to shift away from a predominantly punitive 
role, offering carrots in addition to sticks.53 By fostering trust and cooperation, 
ELPs also promise to expand possibilities for learning and creative problem-
solving.54 In many ELPs, participating facilities disclose information about 
their internal management practices, affording government the chance to 
understand better the constraints and challenges businesses face.55 By building 
a climate of openness, ELPs may foster the dissemination of ideas for solving 
emerging environmental problems or implementing innovative business 
practices.56 Through the requirement for EMSs, ELPs may encourage facility 
managers to take responsibility for regulating the environmental impacts of 
their operations and for reducing the perceived gulf between themselves and 
regulators.57 
ELPs may also stimulate improved relationships between business 
facilities and their local communities. Some ELPs, like EPA’s Performance 
Track, require facilities to develop processes to engage and share information 
with local residents.58 To fulfill this requirement, Performance Track members 
undertake a variety of activities such as hosting recycling drives, assisting local 
wildlife protection organizations, and posting information about their facilities’ 
environmental progress at local government offices.59 Facilities involved in 
ELPs may adopt more collaborative ways of interacting with their neighboring 
communities, reducing costly conflicts and enhancing public trust. 
Relatedly, ELPs’ fourth benefit may come from fostering positive cultural 
change within both business and government. To the extent that the current 
regulatory system fails to address the values and social structures that underlie 
environmental degradation and inhibit lasting change,60 ELPs may better 
stimulate cultural change by encouraging facility managers to interact more 
frequently with those outside their organizations who may value environmental 
 
 52. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 136–37. 
 53. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M. 
Salamon ed., 2002); John Braithwaite, Rewards and Regulation, 29 J.L.& SOC’Y 12, 12 (2002). 
 54. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 223. 
 55. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser, & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: 
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 314 (2004). 
 56. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 148. 
 57. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
 58. EPA, PUB NO. 240-B-05-003, PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE 7 (2005), available at 
http://www.epeat.net/Docs/EPA_PT_Prog_guide.pdf. 
 59. EPA requires that facilities report on public outreach and public reporting activities in annual 
performance reports to the agency. EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Performance Track, Annual Performance 
Reporting, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/program/report.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). 
 60. JOHN EHRENFELD, BEYOND SUSTAINABILITY: WHY AN ALL-CONSUMING CAMPAIGN TO 
REDUCE UNSUSTAINABILITY FAILS 3–4 (2006), available at http://www.changethis.com/ 
25.03.BeyondSustain. 
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protection especially highly.61 Changing the organizational culture of facilities 
could result in fundamental value shifts to the point where environmental 
protection assumes greater importance alongside traditional business 
objectives.62 These programs, in turn, could foster changes in those deeply 
held, yet frequently unstated, assumptions in organizations and thereby shape 
workers’ everyday tasks.63 Through a similar process, ELPs may help change 
the culture of agencies by stimulating more innovative decision making and by 
challenging their blind adherence to established routines that stand in the way 
of learning and policy improvement.64 
B. Sample and Methods 
In light of these four potential benefits, it is easy to understand why policy 
makers and scholars have viewed ELPs so enthusiastically. Yet, to determine 
whether ELPs actually deliver on some or all of their potential, government 
decision makers need careful empirical evaluation. As a necessary step toward 
such research, we have undertaken this study to assess the collection, 
accessibility, and communication of evaluation-relevant data by the most well-
established ELPs. In an important sense, our study seeks to evaluate the degree 
to which ELPs have generated the necessary information to engage in the 
“systematic lesson drawing” these programs are supposed to foster.65 
Of the twenty-four ELPs currently in operation (one federal program and 
twenty-three programs in twenty-two states), we examined EPA’s National 
Environmental Performance Track as well as ELPs operating in the following 
seventeen states: Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.66 As noted, we selected 
these states because their ELPs had all been in place for five years or longer, a 
reasonable length of time for a program to become established and begin to 
attract members.67 Table A-1, presented in Appendix II at the end of this 
 
 61. Jennifer Nash & John Ehrenfeld, Codes of Environmental Management Practice: Assessing 
Their Potential as a Tool for Change 22 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 487, 524 (1997). 
 62. See John R. Ehrenfeld, Cultural Structure and the Challenge of Sustainability, in BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 223, 
228–34 (Ken Sexton, Alfred A. Marcus, K. William Easter, & Timothy D. Burkhardt eds., 1998). 
 63. See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 39, at 11–12. See generally JENNIFER A. HOWARD-
GRENVILLE, CORPORATE CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE: MAKING CHANGE AT A HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURER (2007) (providing an in-depth account of how a facility’s culture affects 
its environmental practices). 
 64. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 172–73. 
 65. Id. at 163. 
 66. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., BASIC INFORMATION ON PERFORMANCE-BASED PROGRAMS 
(2007) (unpublished report, on file with authors). 
 67. Technically, Georgia’s and Wisconsin’s programs could have been considered as slightly 
younger than five years at the time of our study since both programs began in their current form in 2004. 
However, these programs were each based on earlier, similar programs that started prior to 2002. Given 
their histories, we chose to include both these state programs in our study. 
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Article, identifies and provides descriptive information about each of the 
programs in our sample. 
Many of the state programs have multiple “tiers” or levels of participation, 
each with its own separate requirements and rewards. Where appropriate, we 
used the tier as our unit of analysis, which meant that instead of just eighteen 
programs, we actually collected and analyzed data on a total of forty-eight tiers. 
Moreover, entirely independent from this study, analysts at Industrial 
Economics, Inc. classified each tier in each program (or the entire program, if it 
did not have tiers) into one of five categories: (1) Advocate, (2) On-Ramp, (3)  
Middle, (4) Tracking, and (5) Stewardship.68 They based their classification on 
requirements for membership, with On-Ramp tiers being the least demanding 
on participating facilities and Stewardship tiers being the most demanding. 
Programs in the Tracking and Stewardship categories shared characteristics 
equivalent to or more demanding than the EPA’s Performance Track. Advocate 
tiers—which simply recognize those who agree to be supportive of the ELP—
are qualitatively different from other tier types which recognize only those who 
have met varying levels of membership requirements for environmental 
management and compliance.69 
Table A-2, found in Appendix II, lists each program’s tiers and their 
corresponding category according to the Industrial Economics classification 
schema. Later in this Article, we use these tier categories to construct three 
subsamples for analysis: one subsample of all programs and tiers, one 
subsample of programs and tiers in the top three categories (Middle, Tracking, 
and Stewardship categories), and one subsample of programs and tiers in the 
top two categories (Tracking and Stewardship categories).70 
To begin our research, we gathered and reviewed publicly available 
documents on each program in our sample, including material available on 
 
 68. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 66. What we refer to throughout this Article as 
“tracking” programs Industrial Economics labels as “comparable to Performance Track.” 
 69. Our sample included two advocate tiers, one in Georgia and the other in Tennessee. Members 
of Georgia’s advocate tier, known as “Champions,” include community organizations, environmental 
organizations, professional associations, universities, and other organizations. Partnership for a 
Sustainable Georgia: Program Levels and Criteria, http://www.p2ad.org/documents/pp_criteria.html 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2008); Partnership for a Sustainable Georgia: Champion Criteria, 
http://www.p2ad.org/files_pdf/ChampionCriteria.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). They are expected to 
promote the state’s ELP by engaging in activities that encourage facilities to join. Id. Similarly, 
members of Tennessee’s advocate tier, known as “Prospects,” include schools, households, businesses, 
and other organizations. Tennessee Pollution Prevention Partnership (TP3) Members, 
http://www.state.tn.us/environment/ea/tp3/tp3_members.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). An entity 
may become a “Prospect” by sending a signup card to the program. Tennessee Pollution Prevention 
Partnership, TP3 Criteria Overview 1, http://www.state.tn.us/environment/ea/pdf/tp3_criteria_ 
overview.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). 
 70. We initially examined only the first subsample (all programs and tiers). However, since ELPs 
generally impose few if any requirements on advocate tier members and minimal requirements on on-
ramp members, we added a second subsample that excludes these two tier categories. We also undertook 
a separate analysis of the two most selective tier categories, as reflected in the third subsample. 
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program websites.71 During September and October 2007, we collected the 
following information: 
• program application forms and annual reporting templates 
• application and annual reporting instructions, if available 
• other program materials, such as descriptions of benefits, notices of 
meetings organized by the program, and press releases 
• program legislation (for programs based on a specific authorizing 
statute) 
• reports prepared on an annual basis by some state agencies and EPA 
summarizing their program’s activities and impacts. 
After completing our document review for each program and tier, we 
contacted the key managers for all of the programs.72 Our telephone 
conversations, although conducted in an unstructured format, each covered a 
common set of topics: program goals, activities (including communications 
strategies), and data collection.73 In asking about goals, we attempted to  
determine the extent to which environmental and social goals both appeared 
salient and motivated program activities.74 Interviews ranged in length from 
twenty to eighty minutes, and we maintained detailed notes of responses. After 
each interview, we coded the responses according to explicit criteria developed 
as a research team. The information we collected offers a picture of what ELPs 
set out to achieve, how they go about accomplishing their objectives, and how 
they measure and communicate results. 
 
 71. One of us also participated in two workshops organized by EPA and held during the spring of 
2007. The first, on May 8, 2007, in New Orleans, Louisiana, was held in conjunction with the National 
Environmental Partnership Summit. The second, on June 18, 2007, in Madison, Wisconsin, was part of 
the annual meeting of the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Performance. At each 
workshop, EPA asked participants to describe the goals of ELPs. Participants, who represented state 
environmental agencies, private sector firms, EPA, environmental advocacy organizations, and private 
consulting groups, offered a wide range of responses, including directly benefiting the environment, 
improving the environmental performance of non-participants, and saving costs. 
 72. By program managers, we mean the agency staff members who are responsible for day-to-day 
ELP operations. If more than one staff member was responsible for running the ELP, we attempted to 
speak with the most senior member. 
 73. We conducted interviews on a “not for attribution” basis. In the sections of this Article where 
we discuss interview results, we have removed factual details in order not to reveal the identities of the 
people with whom we spoke. For this same reason we do not include quotations from EPA Performance 
Track managers, since that program is sufficiently distinct that quotations could disclose interviewees’ 
identities. 
 74. For example, we would ask something like, “What are the goals of your program?” If the 
interviewee did not mention any of the social goals that dominated the discussions at the EPA 
workshops in New Orleans and Madison (and described supra in note 71), we asked follow up 
questions, such as “Is improving multi-stakeholder relationships a goal?” and “Is changing the culture at 
facilities and agencies a goal?” We coded responses so as to distinguish those given at the interviewee’s 
initiative from those given in response to any of our follow-on prompts. 
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II. FINDINGS FROM THE ELP STUDY 
Each ELP offers at least a slightly different set of goals, activities, 
communication strategies, and data collection practices. Until now, no 
systematic evidence existed about what these programs have been designed to 
accomplish, what they do, and what we can learn from the data they collect. 
This Article is the first comprehensive analysis of all the established state and 
federal ELPs, and it is the first to document what these programs in fact seek to 
accomplish as reflected in their publications and their managers’ responses to 
interview questions. To capture the richness of the variation in our data, we 
organize our findings around six significant themes: program goals; activities 
required to join; activities required to maintain membership; activities 
undertaken by agencies; communication; and data collection. In this Part, we 
present our findings. In Part III, we discuss several of their most important 
implications. 
A. Program Goals 
Program goals shape and reflect the priorities of ELPs. Our research 
examined the extent to which improving environmental quality was an explicit 
goal of the programs we studied and the extent to which ELP goals may extend 
beyond delivering direct environmental benefits or striving to move the overall 
environmental performance curve. We attempted to determine whether other 
goals—specifically, improving relationships, changing culture at facilities and 
agencies, and cost savings—showed up in program documents and were on the 
minds of the program managers with whom we talked. While this second group 
of goals, which we call “social goals,” might not lead to immediate 
improvements in environmental performance, it could set the stage for more 
profound environmental changes over time. 
For each program in our study, we recorded whether the goal statements 
found in program documents or that emerged in our conversations with 
program managers fit into any of our five general categories: (1) direct 
environmental benefits; (2) shifting the environmental performance curve;75 (3) 
improving multi-stakeholder relationships;76 (4) changing business or agency 
culture; and (5) cost-savings. Each program could, of course, have more than 
one of these goals. 
 
 75. “Shifting the environmental performance curve” refers to the idea that ELPs might prompt an 
incremental improvement in the environmental performance of all facilities. See supra notes 43–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 76. In referring to “multi-stakeholder relationships,” we adhere to the usage common among our 
respondents, according to which individuals and organizations affected by environmental management 
and policy are characterized as “stakeholders.”  Specifically, “multi-stakeholder relationships” refers to 
relationships among businesses, government officials, environmental organizations, community groups, 
and individuals. 
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Goal statements were usually straightforward and easy to categorize, but 
at times determining whether a program shared the five general goals we 
identified proved to be more difficult. To illustrate, one of our interview 
respondents stated that the goal of his state’s program was “to reduce pollution 
in the state and make everyone aware of their impact and create networks.” 
This statement most clearly addresses the goal of improving environmental 
quality, as it begins with the unambiguous phrase “to reduce pollution.” In 
addition, the goal statement includes phrases that might suggest, albeit 
indirectly and not as clearly, the goals of changing facility culture (by 
increasing facilities’ awareness of their environmental impacts) and improving 
multi-stakeholder relationships (by creating networks). As a general rule, if 
program documents or a program official clearly identified one of the five goals 
we outlined, we coded that clear goal as a program goal. Thus, in the example, 
we concluded that the program definitely shared the goal of improving 
environmental quality. When program statements indirectly or ambiguously 
identified one the five goals we outlined, we coded it as a program goal only if 
we found additional mention of that goal in another source. Thus, in the 
example the goal statements “to make everyone aware of their impact” and 
“create networks” were alone insufficient to conclude that the program shared 
the goals of changing facility culture or improving multi-stakeholder 
relationships. To conclude these latter goals were indeed attributable to the 
program, we needed to find corroborating evidence in other program 
documents and in our conversations with program managers. 
Before the end of each interview, we specifically asked about any of the 
five goals we outlined that were neither mentioned in the documentation nor by 
the manager without prompting. For each goal we ultimately attributed to a 
program, we kept a record of whether our supporting evidence for that goal 
came from program documents, unprompted comments from the managers, or 
comments prompted by a pointed question about a specific goal. 
We also distinguished “goals” from “activities.” In many cases, program 
statements would expressly identify as “goals” certain items that were more 
properly considered activities or some other means of achieving a larger goal. 
For example, one state program specified a goal of “provid[ing] pollution 
prevention education and public recognition” to participants.77 Another 
explicitly stated as a goal to “[p]rovide . . . regulatory incentives to member 
facilities.”78 These kinds of statements specify a means to an end rather than an 
end in itself and, accordingly, for coding purposes we considered them to be 
evidence of activities, not goals. 
 
 77. Idaho GEMStars, http://www.idahogemstars.org/program/program.html (last visited Sept. 20, 
2008). 
 78. DIV. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, MO. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., FACT SHEET ON MISSOURI 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP 1 (2006), available at http://dnr.missouri.gov/pubs/ 
pub2117.pdf. 
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With this understanding of our coding in mind, Table A-3, in Appendix II, 
and Figure 1, below, summarize our principal findings with respect to goals. 
Our primary observations about program goals are as follows: 
• For each of the five goals we examined, no fewer than ten of the 
eighteen programs in our sample shared that goal. Yet only the goal 
of improving the environment was regularly cited in program 
documents or mentioned by program officials without prompting. 
Each of the other four goals was rarely cited in program documents 
and typically came up in our conversations with program officials 
only after we prompted them. 
•  The most commonly cited goal was improving the environment. 
Documents for all eighteen programs in our sample mentioned this 
goal, and it also came up without prompting in almost every 
conversation with program officials. The following are typical 
responses we heard when we asked about program goals: 
o “To encourage business to move beyond compliance to 
becoming stewards of the environment.” 
o “To recognize companies that are going above and beyond.” 
o “To increase the number of facilities that have systems in 
place to better manage their environmental impacts beyond 
compliance.” 
o “To encourage innovation that leads down the path to 
achieving better environmental results.” 
 
Figure 1. Typical Program Goals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• The second most commonly cited goal in our sample of programs 
was the social goal of changing facility and agency culture. 
Although it was a goal for fourteen of the eighteen programs, it 
appeared in only four of these programs’ documents and never came 
3 COGLIANESE 2/12/2009  11:51:12 AM 
2008] ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS 791 
up in our conversations with program officials without prompting. 
Typical was one program manager who did not mention the goal of 
culture change until prompted—but then was emphatic that the 
program was run independently from the state environmental agency 
as a way of indicating that the program is not the “enemy” of 
business. 
• Across our interviews, program managers conceptualized the goal of 
“culture change” broadly. When prompted, some spoke of the 
general relationship between business and government, rather than 
the culture within a specific regulatory agency. For others, the term 
evoked a discussion about how the ELP might change the culture 
within member facilities. 
• The other goals we outlined—reducing costs at facilities and 
agencies, improving multi-stakeholder relationships, and moving the 
environmental performance curve—were infrequently cited in 
program documents and were rarely emphasized by program 
managers without prompting in our interviews. A majority of 
program managers agreed that these were goals, however, once we 
named them explicitly. For example, one program manager noted 
that his program is “really about pollution prevention and 
sustainability,” but responded that other goals, once we mentioned 
them, are also “important parts of it.” When we asked specifically 
about cost savings as a goal, another program manager said, 
“Absolutely. Pollution prevention always has payback.” Yet another 
answered, “[Cost savings] are not an explicit goal, but we do ask 
[facilities to provide information] about that in their annual reports. 
Some cost savings from alternative compliance are very significant.” 
In contrast, one ELP manager said that cost savings was not a goal 
since implementing an EMS “was not always cost effective.” 
Another program manager felt that his program “can’t force these” 
other goals and that culture change will only occur indirectly over 
time as a byproduct of the program. 
B. Activities Required to Join 
No matter what the goal, ELPs with fewer members inherently have a 
smaller impact on environmental and social conditions, all other things being 
equal. As such, a central challenge for government agencies is to set entry 
criteria so that enough facilities participate to promote agency goals.79 Most 
ELPs limit membership to facilities with certain characteristics. For example, 
many programs restrict participation to facilities with strong compliance 
histories. Many also require facilities to have implemented an EMS, or to have 
 
 79. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 54–57, 62–67. 
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plans to do so. Programs we studied varied with respect to the stringency of 
entry criteria—such as the number of years a facility had operated without a 
compliance problem, or the level of sophistication of its EMS. For many states, 
the mere existence of an EMS was not sufficient for entry; the facility had to 
have established targets and objectives in line with agency priorities for 
pollution prevention and continuous improvement. 
Fourteen of the programs we studied had multiple tiers with varying levels 
of entry stringency. For some tiers, programs limited membership to facilities 
deemed to be top performers, while for other tiers less noteworthy facilities 
were encouraged to participate as a means of encouraging them to undertake 
significant beyond-compliance activities. 
Just as we did to identify program goals, we reviewed program documents 
and interviewed program managers to learn about the activities required for 
facilities to join each program tier. Based on this information, we determined 
whether facilities were required to engage in any of five common activities: (1) 
compliance with environmental regulations; (2) implementation of an EMS; (3) 
independent certification of the EMS; (4) specific environmental performance 
commitments, and (5) specific commitments to community engagement. 
Often the coding of these requirements, like the coding of goals, was 
straightforward. At other times, however, coding required us to make judgment 
calls as consistently as possible. For example, we coded “yes” for “compliance 
with environmental regulations” even if a facility was allowed to have minor 
noncompliance problems, or even if it could have more substantial compliance 
problems if accompanied by a plan to resolve the issue. As long as program 
documents or officials indicated that substantial compliance was expected, we 
treated compliance as an activity required for membership in the tier. For 
example, one state reviewed applicants’ compliance histories over a five-year 
period to determine their eligibility, but it also emphasized that records “need 
not be spotless” and did not specify the precise number or nature of compliance 
problems that it allows. Another, in contrast, defined its compliance standard in 
detail and took into account compliance issues at the corporate level as well as 
at the facility. Both levels of compliance screening merited a “yes” designation 
in our coding. 
We also coded “yes” for implementation of an EMS as long as the 
program tier required facilities to have an environmental plan that included the 
“plan-do-check-act” system that is the hallmark of a traditional EMS.80 This 
meant that we also coded “yes” in cases where a program tier stipulated that a 
facility must have fully implemented an EMS before being accepted into the 
tier, as well as in the case of a tier requiring adoption of an EMS within the 
members’ first year in the program. On the other hand, we coded “no” for EMS 
implementation when a program tier required a facility merely to have in place 
 
 80. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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an environmental policy and a plan for environmental improvement, since this 
requirement did not call for all elements of the “plan-do-check-act” model. 
 
Table 1. Activities Required to Join State and Federal ELPs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We analyzed the data for each of three subsamples based on tier types. 
Table A-4, in Appendix II, shows our data and Table 1, above, displays our 
results. Our primary observations about the activities required to join our 
sample of ELPs are as follows: 
• A vast majority of program tiers (85 percent of all program tiers and 
100 percent of program tiers in the highest two tier categories) 
required potential members to be in compliance with environmental 
regulations. As noted above, however, compliance did not always 
have to be complete. Typically, minor episodes of noncompliance, 
particularly when accompanied by plans to return to compliance, 
were permissible. For example, one state program tier required a 
“commitment to regulatory compliance,” which included a pledge to 
resolve any outstanding compliance issues. Similarly, another 
program required applicants to certify simply that they have “no 
outstanding unresolved violations.” 
• A vast majority of all program tiers (85 percent) required potential 
members to make environmental performance commitments. 
Exceptions were rare; when they occurred, they were typically at the 
lowest tier of a program. For example, to participate in one state’s 
Advocate tier prospective members needed only to complete a form 
with their name, contact information, and membership category 
(school, household, or business) and send it to the state. Another 
state’s initial tier was actually a reward for past environmental 
Activity Required 
to Join 
All Programs, All 
Tiers 
(48 tiers) 
Middle, Tracking, 
and Stewardship 
Tiers  
(35 tiers) 
Tracking and 
Stewardship Tiers  
(13 tiers) 
Compliance with 
Regulations 85.4% 94.3% 100.0% 
EMS 62.5% 77.1% 100.0% 
Independent EMS 
Certification 37.5% 51.4% 84.6% 
Environmental 
Performance 
Commitments 
85.4% 91.4% 92.3% 
Community 
Engagement 
Commitments 
41.7% 51.4% 84.6% 
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achievements and did not require any future commitments for 
membership. 
• Most program tiers (62 percent of all program tiers and 100 percent 
of program tiers in the highest two tier categories), required potential 
members to have an EMS in place. EMS requirements varied, 
however, from adoption of a recognized EMS standard such as ISO 
14001 or the Responsible Care Management System, to development 
of a nonstandard EMS tailored to the facility’s needs and resources. 
Moreover, just over half of the programs and tiers that mandated 
EMSs also required them to be independently certified. 
• A notable minority of all program tiers (42 percent) required 
members to make community engagement commitments, such as 
meeting regularly with local officials and community groups. 
Program tiers in the highest tier categories were substantially more 
likely to require these types of commitments. 
• Program tiers in higher tier categories were also more likely than 
program tiers in lower categories to require prospective members to 
have engaged in all of the five activities shown in Table A-4 and 
Table 1. A majority of the program tiers in the highest three tier 
categories, and no fewer than eleven of thirteen of the program tiers 
in the top two tier categories, required all of the five activities. Note, 
however, that in thirteen of the fifteen states in our sample with 
tiered ELPs, the highest tiers had the fewest members.81 
C. Activities Required to Maintain Membership 
Each of the ELPs we studied established requirements that facilities 
needed to meet or maintain after being admitted. These requirements reveal 
agency expectations for their facility partners. As above, we reviewed program 
documents and interviewed program managers to learn about the activities 
required for facilities to maintain membership in each program. Based on the 
information we gathered, we determined whether member facilities were 
required to engage in any of five common requirements to maintain 
membership: (1) compliance (or continued compliance) with environmental 
regulations; (2) continuation or development of an EMS; (3) reporting on 
performance; (4) progress toward achieving any commitments made in the 
facility’s application; and (5) community engagement. 
As with our previous categories, some requirements for continued 
membership were more clearly stated than others. As with entry requirements, 
we coded “yes” for “compliance with environmental regulations” even if minor 
episodes of noncompliance were permitted, as long as program documents or 
officials stated that substantial compliance was required. In terms of “progress 
 
 81. The exceptions were Colorado and Maine. 
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toward achieving commitments,” we coded “yes” only if program documents 
or conversations with program officials indicated that progress was specifically 
required. 
 
Table 2. Activities Required to Maintain Membership in State Federal ELPs 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We analyzed the data for each of three subsamples based on tier types. 
Table A-5, in Appendix II, shows our data and Table 2, above, shows our 
results. Our primary observations are as follows: 
• Performance reporting was almost universally required for continued 
membership, but the form of this performance reporting varied. For 
example, the primary way that members communicated their 
progress in one state was through an email or a slide presentation at 
the program’s biannual meetings. In another, members submitted 
success stories. In still other states (as well as with the federal 
Performance Track), members filled out detailed reports of their 
pollution levels and community activities. 
• A vast majority of program tiers (76 percent of all program tiers and 
92 percent of program tiers in the highest two tier categories) 
required continued compliance with environmental regulations, 
although, as noted above, minor episodes of noncompliance were 
typically permissible. For example, one state program allowed a 
member to experience a compliance problem as long as it promptly 
disclosed it and developed a plan for correcting it. The manager of 
another state program noted that a facility’s membership in the 
program would be threatened if it had an “environmental black eye” 
but not for less consequential instances of noncompliance. 
Activity Required to 
Maintain 
Membership 
All Programs, 
All Tiers 
(48 tiers) 
Middle, Tracking, and 
Stewardship Tiers  
(35 tiers) 
Tracking and 
Stewardship Tiers  
(13 tiers) 
Compliance with 
Regulations 75.6% 84.4% 91.7% 
Maintain or Develop 
EMS 66.7% 75.0% 91.7% 
Performance 
Reporting 92.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
Progress Toward 
Achieving 
Commitments 
32.9% 38.3% 41.7% 
Community 
Engagement  40.5% 46.9% 75.0% 
Note: Percentages are calculated excluding any activities determined to be “not 
applicable,” as shown in Table A-5 in Appendix II. 
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• A minority of program tiers, even in the highest tier categories, 
expected that members show progress toward achieving their 
commitments.82 Many ELPs exhibited the view expressed in the 
following statement from one program’s website: “[The program] 
does not penalize a facility for lack of improvement as long as [it] is 
making a good faith effort to improve performance and continues to 
meet other program criteria (e.g. consistent record of compliance, 
and EMS criteria specific to each tier).” Many ELPs required 
facilities not showing any progress to explain why they were not. 
Only one ELP manager told us that members categorically “must 
make progress.” 
Program tiers in higher tier categories were more likely to require all of 
the five activities for continued membership, as shown in Table A-5 and Table 
2. For example, four of the five activities were required by more than 75 
percent of program tiers in the highest two categories, but only two of five 
activities were required by more than 75 percent of all program tiers. 
We should note that even in those cases in which ELPs ostensibly required 
facilities to maintain compliance or demonstrate progress to remain members, 
we were unable to determine whether ELP managers enforced these 
requirements. We did not ask managers how they responded when confronted 
with members failing to make progress or in noncompliance. We do know, 
though, that managers of some ELPs (most notably EPA’s Performance Track) 
do ask members to leave the program or deny requests for membership 
renewal.83 
D. Activities Undertaken by Agencies 
In addition to establishing tier entry requirements, screening members, and 
ensuring that members continue to meet program requirements throughout their 
tenure, government agencies themselves undertake a variety of activities under 
the auspices of ELPs. We reviewed program documents and questioned 
program managers to learn about these activities. Based on this information, we 
determined whether agencies engaged in any of four common categories of 
activities: (1) offering opportunities for members to interact with government 
 
 82. If program documents did not include specific language mandating progress, and if program 
managers did not mention progress as a requirement for continued membership, we concluded that 
progress was not necessary. 
 83. EPA’s fourth annual progress report notes that as of the end of 2005, the agency had asked 
thirty-four facilities to leave Performance Track and had denied renewal to an additional fifteen.  OFFICE 
OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. NO. 100 R 06 001, LEADING 
CHANGE: PERFORMANCE TRACK FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 14 (2006), available at http:// 
epa.gov/performancetrack/downloads/PT_4th_Progress_Report.pdf. Reasons for removals or renewal 
denials included “deficient EMSs” and “failing to submit Annual Performance Reports.” Id. 
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officials, the community, and each other; (2) providing mentoring 
opportunities; (3) providing incentives; and (4) sharing information.84 
We coded “yes” for a broad variety of specific activities within each of the 
four categories. We coded “yes” for “opportunities for members to interact” 
even if an agency provided such opportunities infrequently or only for a subset 
of members. For example, one state offered members the opportunity to meet 
with environmental agency officials to discuss possible incentives but provided 
few other chances for interacting. Some states, in contrast, emphasized formal 
and informal meetings of members, potential members, and agency officials as 
their programs’ most frequent and important activities. We coded “yes” for 
“providing incentives” for a wide category of possible incentives, including 
public recognition, the presentation of an award, and regulatory relief. 
Likewise, we coded “yes” for “information sharing” if the notion of sharing 
knowledge came up in program documents or in our conversations with 
program officials, regardless of the means used to do so (for example, through 
site visits or the distribution of literature). 
 
Figure 2. Typical Program Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-6, in Appendix II, and Figure 2, above, present our findings. Our 
primary observations about the activities undertaken by agencies are as follows: 
• All eighteen programs offered incentives to members. Most program 
tiers publicly recognized members as strong environmental 
performers, sent them a certificate, and allowed them to use the 
program’s logo. Some programs went further, providing discounts to 
members on permit fees, extensions to the duration of permits, and 
expedited permitting. Some provided a single point of contact within 
 
 84. Our cursory review of program descriptive materials revealed that these activities were 
common to many ELPs, so we sought to determine their pervasiveness by further investigation. 
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the agency to handle all of a member’s permits. Still others offered 
“customized variances” in which their states granted flexibility with 
respect to certain rules at a facility’s request (after careful 
deliberation to determine that the request would not adversely affect 
environmental quality), as well as reduced inspection frequency and 
reduced reporting. 
• All but one program explicitly encouraged information sharing, 
particularly in the areas of pollution prevention and EMS 
development. Before facilities were admitted to one state’s program, 
for example, program managers visited the site for an “opportunities 
assessment” in which the agency suggested specific “best practices” 
that would improve the plant’s environmental performance. All 
members in another program were eligible for free technical 
assistance. Many programs promised chances for “making contacts 
and sharing successful project ideas,” as stated in one website. 
• Most programs (fifteen of eighteen programs, and possibly one 
more85) provided opportunities for members to interact with 
representatives of government, other firms, and the community, 
although the degree to which agencies emphasized these 
opportunities varied. One program manager told us that his program 
facilitates numerous “incredibly dynamic” working sessions at 
which companies share experiences about reducing their 
environmental impacts. At one session, two members discovered 
that one plant’s waste could be an input to the other’s manufacturing 
process. “It [was] a marriage made in heaven,” said the program 
manager. Another told us that networking sessions organized by his 
program allowed facilities to “borrow wheels instead of inventing 
them.” Successful sessions were not the rule, however. The manager 
of another program told us that networking sessions “never really 
took off” in her state due to lack of interest on the part of facilities. 
• A bare majority of programs offered mentoring activities in which 
members helped prospective members improve their environmental 
performance. Serving as a mentor was required of members in at 
least two state program tiers. 
 
E. Communication 
ELPs promoted communication in various ways. As noted above, 
programs expected members to communicate performance information, and 
agencies were engaged in various networking and recognition activities that 
 
 85. We received conflicting information from different sources about opportunities for interaction 
in the Texas program. 
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help foster learning and diffusion of information. All of the agencies in our 
sample had developed websites that included basic information about the 
programs, such as their purpose and major activities. In addition, some agencies 
communicated with facilities through site visits and technical assistance. Others 
organized annual meetings for members. 
To learn about other methods of communication, we reviewed program 
documents and interviewed program managers. Based on this information, we 
determined whether programs engaged in each of several common methods of 
communication: (1) publishing annual reports about the program on program 
websites; (2) posting data on individual members on program websites; (3) 
holding public meetings; and (4) issuing press releases.86 
We were careful to distinguish between two types of information that 
programs might post on their websites. We coded “yes” for “annual reports 
about the program posted on website” as long as a program posted some sort of 
regular report about aggregate trends among its members, even if its report was 
incomplete. We coded “yes” for “information on individual members posted on 
website” as long as a program posted some data about at least a subset of 
members, even if the data posted did not include all the information submitted 
by members to the program. For example, some programs posted facilities’ 
annual performance reports as well as reports on the programs’ 
accomplishments overall. For such programs, we coded “yes” for both 
categories. Another program only posted facility reports, while still another 
only posted a report for the entire program. We gave the former program a 
“yes” for “information on individual members posted on website” and the latter 
program a “yes” for “annual reports posted on website.” 
 
Figure 3. Typical Methods of Communication 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86. Our initial review of program descriptive materials revealed that these four communication 
activities were common to many ELPs, so we sought in our further investigation to determine more 
precisely how frequently they were used. 
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Table A-7, in Appendix II, and Figure 3, above, present our findings. Our 
primary observations about programs’ communication activities are as follows: 
• For our sample of programs, press releases were the most common 
method used to communicate program results. Fourteen of eighteen 
programs issued press releases. Some programs utilized the news 
media for publicity more than others. Documents available for one 
program noted that the news media had published more than fifty 
stories about its activities, not including stories about individual 
facilities joining the program. Another program manager worked 
with the business editors of city newspapers to arrange for weekly 
columns highlighting the program’s members. 
• A majority of programs (eleven of eighteen programs, and possibly 
one more87) posted on their websites some information about 
individual members. Only six programs (and possibly one more88) 
posted annual program reports, however. One program manager told 
us that she was not sure “what to do with” the information facility 
managers submitted to her in their annual reports. “In most cases, 
companies are doing their own showcasing all on their own,” she 
said. “It’s difficult for us to make statements about program benefits 
since everyone tracks things differently.” 
F. Data Collection 
Data collection serves multiple purposes. Facilities that are required to 
collect and submit data must establish internal procedures for measuring 
progress toward beyond-compliance commitments. They must share 
information with agencies and community groups they might otherwise ignore 
or only communicate with in a more limited fashion. The information they 
disclose provides a window into internal operations and commitments. Data 
collected by ELPs serves other important purposes, including performance 
measurement, communication of results, and program evaluation. We 
specifically investigated the suitability of these data for evaluating program 
effectiveness. 
In our review, we assessed the data collected by our sample of programs 
on five dimensions: (1) relevance; (2) quality; (3) aggregational value; (4) 
inferential value; and (5) accessibility. Table 3 summarizes the criteria we used 
to assess each dimension. 
 
 
 
 87. We received conflicting information from different sources about the availability of online 
information in the Louisiana program. 
 88. We received conflicting information from different sources about the availability of annual 
program reports for the Louisiana program. 
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Table 3. Characteristics of Data for Evaluating Results of Environmental 
Leadership Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We considered first whether data submitted by facilities and collected by 
agencies were relevant to the stated goals of the program. Ideally, the data 
directly captured progress toward the goals of the program. For example, when 
a program’s goal was to improve the environmental performance of facilities, 
information about such things as facility emissions and resource consumption 
would be relevant. If a goal were to improve the relationship between 
Relevance Do the data measure the stated goals of the program? 
  
 Best case: Data directly measure the goal or outcome. 
 Second-best case: Data measure some proxy of the goal or 
outcome (a variable highly correlated with the goal or 
outcome). 
  
Quality Are the data credible and reliable? 
  
 Program provides clear instructions for data collection and 
reporting. 
 Facilities have an EMS (preferably third-party certified) that 
helps to guide data collection. 
 Program includes a screening process for review of data 
accuracy and completeness. 
 Program conducts site visits to verify data or EMS (or both). 
 One or more identifiable individuals certify the accuracy of the 
data at each facility. 
  
Aggregational Value Can the data from individual facilities be aggregated? 
  
 Data are reported in standard units (quantitative or qualitative). 
 Data include normalization factors where appropriate. 
  
Inferential Value Can the data be used to draw broader conclusions about the impact of the environmental program? 
  
 Longitudinal data are available: 
 • Data on performance of participating facilities over 
time. 
 • Data on performance of participating facilities 
before the program began. 
 Cross-sectional data on the performance of nonparticipants are 
available: 
 • Data specifically gathered by program. 
 • Data not gathered by program but available through 
other sources. 
  
Accessibility Are the data readily available for analysis by members of the public? 
  
 Data are available to the public in a timely manner. 
 Complete and thorough data are available to the public. 
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businesses and the community, relevant data—whether qualitative or 
quantitative—would focus on such things as public attitudes toward local 
businesses. 
We also considered data quality, that is, the degree to which data were 
credible and reliable. High-quality data were collected in accordance with clear 
instructions, and their quality and completeness were verified. Examples of 
verification processes used by many programs included third-party EMS 
verification, site visits, application advisory councils, and review by program 
staff. Also, many programs required senior-level plant officials to sign off on 
their facilities’ data, possibly lending further credibility to the submitted data. 
To evaluate program effectiveness overall, data submitted by different facilities 
need to be aggregated. As such, data will be most useful for evaluation (that is, 
will have high aggregational value) when they are submitted in standard units 
and include normalization factors.89 In our review, we noted whether 
programs’ applications and annual reports required facilities to present 
information in a standardized and normalized format. 
We also considered the inferential value of the data, that is, whether they 
could be used to draw broader conclusions about the impact of the program.90 
For data to have inferential value, they need to be coupled with an 
appropriately measured baseline for the purposes of comparison. One type of 
baseline is temporal, that is, data collected before as well as after the 
establishment of an ELP. Another type is comparative or cross-sectional, which 
calls for the same data from a comparison group of facilities not participating in 
or affected by the ELP. Information about the comparison group could 
presumably be gathered by a program office within an agency (such as 
information on toxic releases from EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory), or 
obtained from other sources (such as information about energy usage from 
utility companies). 
Finally, we considered data accessibility. Only data that are accessible can 
be used for evaluation. As such, we asked: Are data easily accessed by 
members of the public in a timely manner? Is all collected information or only 
select portions made available? 
 
 89. Absolute reductions in pollution are what ultimately matter for environmental and public 
health protection. Normalized reductions matter only for purposes of determining program effectiveness. 
For example, suppose overall pollution decreases. The only way to know whether a program caused the 
decrease is to control for a number of factors, especially some measure of economic output. The 
program might be effective if pollution per unit of economic output decreases. But it is almost certainly 
not effective if pollution per unit of economic output increases, in which case any observed absolute 
reduction in pollution is due to a decrease in output, not to the program. Similarly, suppose overall 
pollution increases. If pollution per unit output decreases, then the overall pollution increase is probably 
due to the increase in economic output. In other words, the program might actually be effective, just not 
effective enough to overcome the growth in economic output. 
 90. See Coglianese & Bennear, supra note 32, at 253–55, for a discussion on the several 
challenges of drawing causal inferences in the context of environmental innovation. 
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As with other features, we reviewed program documents and interviewed 
program managers to assess the relevance, quality, aggregational value, 
inferential value, and availability of the data collected by our sample of state 
programs. We looked separately at the data collected in support of each of the 
five typical program goals outlined earlier in this Article for each tier of the 
state programs. In each category, we assessed scores of “H” for high, “M” for 
medium, and “L” for low based on the criteria shown in Table 3. If a particular 
program tier did not collect any data in support of a given goal, we coded it as 
“not applicable.”91 
We analyzed the data for each of three subsamples based on tier types. 
Tables A-8, A-9, and A-10, in Appendix II, show the scores we assigned to 
each data characteristic, and Tables 4, 5, and 6, below, show aggregate 
statistics for each of the subsamples. Our primary observations are as follows: 
• Programs collected more data to measure “direct environmental 
benefits” than for any other goal. Almost 90 percent of all program 
tiers, and 100 percent of the program tiers in the highest two tier 
categories, collected at least some data that could be used to track 
environmental benefits. 
 
 91. We assigned ratings of “H,” “M,” or “L” based on the following considerations. With respect 
to relevance, a program or tier that gathered data that measured a goal or outcome directly earned a 
rating of “H.” A program or tier that gathered data that measured a proxy of the goal or outcome earned 
a rating of “M.” A program or tier that did not gather any relevant data earned a rating of “n/a” for not 
applicable. With respect to quality, we took into account the following five considerations: (1) whether 
the program offered clear instructions for data collection and reporting; (2) whether it required an EMS 
that would presumably guide data collection; (3) whether the agency had established a screening process 
for review of data accuracy and completeness; (4) whether the program conducted site visits to verify 
data or the EMS; and (5) whether someone at the facility certified the accuracy of the data. For each 
consideration, we gave each program or tier a “Yes” or “No” determination. When we assessed the 
quality of data relevant to direct environmental benefits, we weighted each of these considerations 
equally so that for each “Yes” the program or tier earned one point. A score of 0–1 became a rating of 
“L,” a score of 2–3 became a rating of “M,” and a score of 4–5 became a rating of “H.” When we 
assessed the quality of data relevant to improving stakeholder relationships and cost savings for 
facilities and agencies, however, we determined that the first criterion—clear instructions for data 
collection and reporting—should weigh more heavily than the others such that no program or tier that 
offered little guidance for how facilities should collect or report these data could earn greater than a 
rating of “M” for quality, and no program or tier that offered no guidance could earn greater than a 
rating of “L.” We reasoned, for example, that programs or tiers that merely included a column on their 
annual reporting form with the heading “cost savings,” without any information about how facilities 
should calculate that number, would likely collect data that was neither reliable nor credible. With 
respect to aggregational value, programs or tiers that reported data in standard units and using 
normalizing factors earned a rating of “H.” Programs or tiers that reported either in standard units or 
using normalizing factors earned a rating of “M.” Programs or tiers that used neither standard units nor 
normalizing factors earned a rating of “L.” With respect to inferential value, a program that provided 
both longitudinal data and cross-sectional data earned a rating of “H.” A program that provided some 
longitudinal data, such as performance over time, or the possibility of some cross-sectional data, such as 
compliance information for non-participants, earned a rating of “M.” A program that provided neither 
longitudinal nor cross-sectional data earned a rating of “L.” With respect to accessibility, we considered 
the degree to which a program or tier provided to the public data on individual members’ participation. 
If it provided all available data, it earned a rating of “H”; if it only provided some data, it earned a rating 
of “M”; if it provided no data, it earned a rating of “L.” 
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• The data collected to measure direct environmental benefits scored 
“high” on relevance across all program tiers. The quality of these 
data, however, was varied: more tiers scored “medium” or “low” on 
data quality than scored “high.” As one manager noted, “People try 
hard, but they turn in ‘junk information.’ They write down kilograms 
but they mean liters. As a first step, I always do an ‘ocular analysis’ 
to flag things that just don’t make sense.” Another commented that 
he had “no way of knowing” if the submitted information is correct. 
“Mostly we take people’s word for it. This is a good faith program,” 
he explained. Other program managers were trusting of the data they 
received. One manager reported that he believes the data members 
send to him because the members check the information internally 
and certify its accuracy. Another manager believed that personal 
relationships ensured the quality of information; he trusted the data 
“100 percent” because his state is small and all the members knew 
each other—and him. 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of 
“Direct Environmental Benefits” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data 
Characteristic Score 
All Programs, 
All Tiers 
(48 tiers) 
Middle, Tracking, 
and Stewardship 
Tiers  
(35 tiers) 
Tracking and 
Stewardship 
Tiers  
(13 tiers) 
High 89.6% 97.1% 100% 
Medium 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Low 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Data 
Relevance 
n/a 10.4% 2.9% 0.0% 
High 41.7% 57.1% 84.6% 
Medium 39.6% 37.1% 15.4% 
Low 8.3% 2.9% 0.0% Data Quality 
n/a 10.4% 2.9% 0.0% 
High 29.2% 34.3% 46.2% 
Medium 20.8% 25.7% 30.8% 
Low 39.6% 37.1% 23.1% 
Aggregational 
Value 
n/a 10.4% 2.9% 0.0% 
High 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Medium 56.2% 71.4% 92.3% 
Low 33.3% 25.7% 7.7% 
Inferential 
Value 
n/a 10.4% 2.9% 0.0% 
High 20.8% 22.9% 30.8% 
Medium 31.2% 34.3% 30.8% 
Low 37.5% 40.0% 38.5% 
Data 
Accessibility 
n/a 10.4% 2.9% 0.0% 
Note: “High” is our top score in a category. “Low” is our bottom score in a category. 
Percentages based on Table A-8 in Appendix II. 
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• The aggregational and inferential values of data measuring 
environmental impacts were generally low, even for program tiers in 
the highest tier categories. As shown in Table 4, less than one-third 
of all program tiers, and less than one-half of program tiers in the 
highest two tier categories, scored “high” on aggregational value. 
The inferential value of the data was particularly low. No tier in any 
category scored “high” on inferential value.92 In other words, even 
when programs collected direct measures of environmental impacts, 
these measures usually lacked some of the essential characteristics 
needed to be able to use these data to draw conclusions about the 
aggregate performance of members and the overall impact of the 
programs. For example, one state program requires applicants to 
provide detailed and relevant information, with documentation, 
about their past achievements and future commitments, but it does 
not require standardized units or normalization, nor does it follow up 
with any requirement for annual reports that could provide data over 
time. In some cases, improving data’s aggregational value by 
requiring facilities to standardize and normalize information was 
perceived to conflict with the desired style of a program. As noted in 
one program’s annual report, “[t]radition might suggest a prescribed 
format [for reporting by facilities], but that level of prescription is 
what [our program] challenges us to minimize.”93 
• Many program tiers (exactly half of all program tiers and eleven of 
thirteen of those in the highest two tier categories) collected some 
measures of improvement in multi-stakeholder relationships. 
Although the collected data averaged “medium” in quality, the data 
cannot confidently be used to assess the impacts of the programs on 
multi-stakeholder relationships. As shown in Table 5, no program 
tier collected data that measured “high” on either aggregational or 
inferential value. Moreover, far more tiers scored “low” than 
“medium” on aggregational and inferential value for data on 
stakeholder relationships, even those tiers in the highest two tier 
categories. 
 
 
 92. Some program tiers did collect “baseline” data on each member’s performance when it first 
joined the program. But even these data, while informative, have quite limited inferential value. To draw 
confident inferences about the effects of programs, longitudinal data need to include information on 
members’ performance well before they contemplated joining the program. Data over multiple years 
prior to joining are needed to determine the trends in emissions over time, so as to be able to determine 
if the program affected these preexisting trends. For a discussion of longitudinal analysis, see Cary 
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 UNI. ILL. L. REV. 1111–37 (2002). 
 93. WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., 2007 GREEN TIER BIENNIAL PROGRESS REPORT 16 (2007), 
available at http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/caer/cea/environmental/reports/2007report.pdf. 
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Table 5. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of 
“Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Almost half the program tiers collected highly relevant measures of 
cost savings for facilities and agencies. These data, though, were 
most often “low” in quality, and as with data collected to measure 
multi-stakeholder relationships, they cannot confidently be used to 
infer the overall cost savings provided by the programs. As shown in 
Table 6, all the program tiers that collect data on cost savings score 
“medium” on aggregational value, and most of them score “low” on 
inferential value. 
• Only one program has collected data to measure progress toward the 
goals of shifting the environmental performance curve and changing 
the culture of facilities and agencies. In 2006, EPA surveyed 
Performance Track members in an attempt to assess the program’s 
impact on environmental performance, relationships with external 
Data 
Characteristic Score 
All Programs, 
All Tiers 
(48 tiers) 
Middle, Tracking, 
and Stewardship 
Tiers  
(35 tiers) 
Tracking and 
Stewardship 
Tiers 
(13 tiers) 
High 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Medium 41.7% 45.7% 69.2% 
Low 8.3% 8.6% 15.4% 
Data 
Relevance 
n/a 50.0% 45.7% 15.4% 
High 16.7% 22.9% 30.8% 
Medium 20.8% 20.0% 46.2% 
Low 12.5% 11.4% 7.7% Data Quality 
n/a 50.0% 45.7% 15.4% 
High 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Medium 18.8% 20.0% 38.5% 
Low 31.2% 34.3% 46.2% 
Aggregational 
Value 
n/a 50.0% 45.7% 15.4% 
High 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Medium 4.2% 5.7% 15.4% 
Low 45.8% 48.6% 69.2% 
Inferential 
Value 
n/a 50.0% 45.7% 15.4% 
High 18.8% 20.0% 30.8% 
Medium 14.6% 17.1% 30.8% 
Low 16.7% 17.1% 23.1% 
Data 
Accessibility 
n/a 50.0% 45.7% 15.4% 
Note: “High” is our top score in a category. “Low” is our bottom score in a category. 
Percentages based on Table A-9 in Appendix II. 
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stakeholders, and culture change.94 Other than this survey, no 
program in our sample collected data to measure progress toward 
these goals, even those programs that cited them as goals. We did 
not include tables showing the characteristics of data collected in 
support of these two goals, as they would have been completely full 
of “not applicables.” 
 
Table 6. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of “Cost 
Savings for Facilities and Agencies” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Making data accessible was a challenge for many programs. For 
each of the three goals discussed above, a majority of tiers that 
collected data scored “medium” or “low” on accessibility. Moreover, 
at least as many program tiers scored “low” on data accessibility as 
 
 94. ABT ASSOCS., RESULTS OF THE 2006 PERFORMANCE TRACK MEMBERS SURVEY 15–23 (2007), 
available at http://epa.gov/performancetrack/members/downloads/2006MembersSurveyReportFinal 
062607.pdf. 
Data 
Characteristic Score 
All 
Programs, 
All Tiers 
(48 tiers) 
Middle, Tracking, 
and Stewardship 
Tiers  
(35 tiers) 
Tracking and 
Stewardship Tiers 
(13 tiers) 
High 47.90% 57.10% 46.20% 
Medium 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Low 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Data 
Relevance 
n/a 52.10% 42.90% 53.80% 
High 4.20% 5.70% 7.70% 
Medium 12.50% 14.30% 7.70% 
Low 31.20% 37.10% 30.80% 
Data Quality 
n/a 52.10% 42.90% 53.80% 
High 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Medium 47.90% 57.10% 46.20% 
Low 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aggregational 
Value 
n/a 52.10% 42.90% 53.80% 
High 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Medium 8.30% 8.60% 7.70% 
Low 39.60% 48.60% 38.50% 
Inferential 
Value 
n/a 52.10% 42.90% 53.80% 
High 8.30% 8.60% 7.70% 
Medium 12.50% 14.30% 7.70% 
Low 27.10% 34.30% 30.80% 
Data 
Accessibility 
n/a 52.10% 42.90% 53.80% 
Note: “High” is our top score in a category. “Low” is our bottom score in a category. 
Percentages based on Table A-10 in Appendix II. 
3 COGLIANESE 2/12/2009  11:51:12 AM 
808 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 35:771 
scored “medium.” The primary reason for these lower scores was 
that most programs did not post facility applications and annual 
performance reports on their websites, even though the documents 
were generally available upon request. “Companies don’t want 
others to see their environmental impacts and aspects,” one manager 
explained. More commonly, programs posted online selected 
information, aggregate statistics, or “success stories” that included 
some data. For example, one state program posted narratives about 
its members on its website but did not post the environmental 
performance data that it collected through its members’ detailed 
annual reports. Selected success stories can certainly provide a basis 
for useful communication and diffusion of innovations, but for 
evaluation purposes they are usually of little value because they are 
not a representative sample of all the facilities affected by the 
program. 
We found that ELPs varied considerably in the amount and type of 
information they collected. Some programs were information-rich, while others 
gathered relatively little information about member activities. If the quantity 
and type of information collected by these programs is central to their ability to 
contribute to systemic policy learning, then clearly some programs are doing 
better than others. 
Of course, differences in information collection should not be taken to 
suggest any judgment about the impact or value of the program in terms of 
environmental protection or the achievement of what we have called ELPs’ 
social goals. We also recognize that the cost of collecting and analyzing data 
that would meet the criteria we have outlined in Table 3 may be beyond the 
highly constrained budgets that many states have given their ELPs. On average 
the state programs in our sample only had about two staff members each—a 
small number, suggesting that these programs have not been designed to collect 
and analyze extensive data. Moreover, even though programs that collect large 
amounts of high-quality data will be easier to evaluate, they are not necessarily 
more effective in achieving their goals. Some programs with few resources 
dedicated to data collection could still have significant impacts; such impacts 
would just be immeasurable ones. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMATIC POLICY LEARNING 
When considered in the aggregate, our findings provide insight into larger 
questions about ELPs’ structure and evaluation. In this Part, we draw upon our 
findings to discuss three issues: variation among programs, the match between 
program activities and goals, and the role and use of data in learning from and 
about ELPs. 
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A. Variations among Programs 
Our principal findings reveal significant variation in the range of goals, 
activities, methods of communication, and data collection undertaken by ELPs. 
Although EPA and scholars have treated these programs as belonging to a 
single category of policy instruments, in reality ELPs are a diverse collection of 
programs. 
The greatest similarities can be found in EPA’s Performance Track and 
the highest tier programs in states such as Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia. Performance Track exhibits all the characteristics we coded for and 
collects data that generally score between “high” and “medium” on our criteria. 
The highest tiers in Georgia’s “Partnership for a Sustainable Georgia” and in 
Texas’s “Clean Texas” program pursued all five of the goals, required nine of 
ten requirements for joining and staying in the program, engaged in four of five 
of the coded agency activities and two or three methods of communication, and 
gathered data that generally scored between “high” and “medium” on our 
criteria. The highest tiers of Tennessee’s “Pollution Prevention Partnership” 
program and Virginia’s “Environmental Excellence Program” shared a similar 
number of characteristics as the programs in Texas and Georgia and gathered 
data that averaged “medium” according to our criteria. 
Other programs, on the other hand, only scored high in specific categories 
of coded characteristics. For example, six other programs shared four or five of 
the hypothesized goals; the highest tiers of eight programs required four or five 
of the common activities for joining the program; and the highest tiers of a 
similar but not identical set of six programs collected data that averaged at least 
“medium” on our criteria. These other programs did not, however, match our 
criteria across the board as completely as Performance Track and the highest 
tiers of the Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia programs. 
Moreover, a number of the state programs, even at their highest tiers, 
displayed less than half of the characteristics we examined.95 This is perhaps 
not surprising, since some of these programs, such as New Mexico’s “Green 
Zia Environmental Excellence Recognition Program,” were found to be just 
one-time award programs that largely recognized past environmental 
achievements and collected limited data to document them. Others, such as 
Idaho’s “GEMStars” program and Louisiana’s “Environmental Leadership 
Program,” were found to be ongoing membership programs that shared a few 
of the characteristics in each of our categories and collected data that met a few 
of our criteria—but were not very expansive in scope or in their activities 
compared to other programs. 
 
 95. In other words, for some states the most stringent tiers were akin to what we have called 
“Middle” tiers for other states.  For example, in Idaho and Louisiana, the highest tiers were comparable 
to “Middle” tiers. New Mexico’s most stringent tier ranked as “Tracking,” but its design was 
substantially different from other ELPs. 
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It is critical to reiterate that our findings in this study, and particularly the 
summaries in the paragraphs above, do not speak to how effectively the 
programs achieve their goals. It is entirely possible that the programs that met 
most of our coded characteristics and collected data that scored well on our 
criteria have not met their objectives as well as other programs. We simply 
cannot say. Our analysis has been intended to provide insight into the structure 
and operation of ELPs and the characteristics of the data they collect, all as a 
prelude to systematic program evaluation research. One implication of our 
study for future research on ELPs is that researchers should take into account 
the variation in the programs. Researchers can and should assess how the 
differences we have documented might influence these programs’ effectiveness 
in terms of achieving environmental and social goals. 
B. Mapping Activities to Goals 
Another way our study could be used to inform future research on 
program effectiveness is by linking program activities to program goals. To be 
effective, a program must presumably design its activities to support its stated 
goals. In this study, we did not assess the effectiveness of program activities 
nor did we empirically investigate the links between activities and goals. 
Nonetheless, we can pose a series of suppositions as to how program activities 
and goals are currently linked. 
For example, the activities most connected with the goal of providing 
direct environmental benefits might presumably be having members make 
environmental performance commitments and then make progress toward 
achieving them. Most program tiers (over 85 percent overall) required 
environmental performance commitments. But far fewer tiers (less than 33 
percent overall and less than 42 percent of tiers in the highest two tier 
categories) mandated that members show progress toward meeting all those 
commitments. Thus, even though it would seem that the initial membership 
requirements of many programs connected well with the goal of improving 
environmental quality, the activities required to maintain membership in these 
programs frequently did not seem to connect as well. Surprisingly, in a 
substantial number of state programs, facilities may have remained members in 
good standing while achieving little or no progress toward commitments they 
had made.96 
 
 96. Some program officials may view the required commitments as spurs for improvement, rather 
than binding ends themselves. In other words, programs could be designed to allow firms to make 
“stretch goals” that are hard to attain, if doing so would encourage firms to make good faith efforts to 
improve their environmental performance beyond what they would otherwise have done, even if those 
improvements fail to meet firms’ stated goals. Of course, if government officials do not expect any or 
much progress toward firms’ commitments to remain in ELPs, it is hard to see how over the long term 
the process of making commitments—attainable or otherwise—would provide much incentive for firms 
to engage in costly efforts to improve their environmental performance significantly. 
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The goal of improving multi-stakeholder relationships may be advanced 
when ELPs require members to engage the community as well as when they 
provide regular opportunities for members to interact with government officials 
and other companies.97 Relatively few program tiers (less than 42 percent 
overall but far more at the higher tier categories) required potential members to 
establish community engagement goals or commitments, and even fewer (less 
than 41 percent overall and 75 percent in the highest two tier categories) 
required members to engage the community to maintain membership. On the 
other hand, most programs (at least fifteen of eighteen) provided opportunities 
for interaction among stakeholders. 
A government activity closely connected with the goal of shifting the 
environmental performance curve might be the provision of mentorship 
opportunities.98 Over half of the programs in our sample provided such 
opportunities. Another program feature that might help shift the performance 
curve could be the establishment of several different membership tiers. 
Fourteen state programs in our sample had more than one tier, but EPA’s 
Performance Track and three state programs in our sample did not. The 
existence of multiple tiers may encourage facilities that would like to improve, 
even though they might not yet have the resources or expertise to show a high 
level of achievement.99 
An activity quite plausibly connected with the goal of changing the culture 
at facilities is the implementation of an EMS. Almost two-thirds of all program 
tiers and all tiers in the highest two tier categories required facilities to have an 
EMS to join the program and to maintain or develop an EMS as a condition for 
continued membership. Thus, program requirements for some but not all 
programs could plausibly be said to support the goal of changing facility 
culture. 
An activity connected with the goal of reducing costs for facilities and 
agencies might be providing incentives of regulatory flexibility to members. 
 
 97. When a facility sponsors a community recycling drive or shares information about its 
environmental performance with community groups, the assumption is that this will lead to increased 
trust and cooperation between the facility and the community. Of course, it is also possible that the 
reverse could occur. Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese, & Jennifer Nash, Evaluating the Social 
Effects of Performance-Based Environmental Programs, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,697, 10,698–99 (2008). 
 98. For a discussion of shifting the performance curve, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying 
text. 
 99. Of course, this does not mean that establishing multiple tiers is always easy for government to 
do. When it launched Performance Track, EPA initially planned to implement both an Achievement 
Track and a more rigorous Stewardship Track. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FIRST PHASE PUBLIC 
MEETINGS ON THE DESIGN OF THE STEWARDSHIP TRACK 1–2 (n.d.) (unpublished summary of 
discussions held in the fall of 2000 in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Chicago, on file with 
authors). In the rush to get the program running, EPA postponed development of the Stewardship Track 
and admitted its first members to the Achievement Track. EPA had trouble articulating what additional 
requirements should be imposed on Stewardship Track members, so it later abandoned plans for a more 
demanding tier. EPA’s history demonstrates a key challenge of multiple-tiered programs: defining 
criteria for entry and ongoing membership that are unambiguous and encourage participation. 
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Although all programs provided some incentives to members, such as 
recognition, only some of the program tiers offered specific forms of regulatory 
flexibility, where cost savings could presumably be achieved. 
These observations suggest that notwithstanding the various goals 
attributed to them, ELPs have not been consistently designed to achieve all of 
these goals. To be sure, our postulations about the connections between 
different activities and different goals are by no means complete or definitive. 
However, they do show how our empirical findings about activities and goals 
can point the way for future analysis and program evaluation.100 Such an 
evaluation might test whether activities do in fact contribute to program goals, 
through collection and analysis of appropriate data. 
C. Data Collection 
Finally, a central purpose of our study has been to assess the 
characteristics of the data programs collect from their members. As discussed 
in Part II.F., we observed that most of the data collected pertain to facilities’ 
environmental performance. While we have found that these indicators are 
usually of reasonable quality and trustworthiness, program and participant data 
are simply not scrutinized or audited very closely in a number of states.101 
Moreover, due to limitations in aggregational and inferential value, these data 
cannot generally be used to draw inferences about program efficacy. 
Nonetheless, the data being collected may be useful in a number of other 
ways. For example, program managers and independent analysts can use these 
data simply to characterize what member facilities are doing. Government can 
publicize individual facilities’ data in raw form to highlight good (or bad) 
cases. In many programs, such as EPA’s Performance Track, officials can 
aggregate the data at the program level to describe the collective environmental 
performance of members. When environmental data from multiple years are 
available—and often they are—they can show trends in the performance of 
members over time. Even if the data cannot show that the programs themselves 
caused these trends (because of the absence of a control group of 
nonparticipants against which to measure the trends), the data can nevertheless 
suggest potential changes. 
If governments want ELPs to gather data that could be used to assess 
program effectiveness over time, they would do well to seek to collect data that 
share all of the characteristics identified in Table 3. Data collection and 
reporting requirements should be designed to maximize relevance, quality, 
aggregational value, and inferential value. When it comes to environmental 
performance indicators, where most programs currently fall short is in ensuring 
 
 100. Such evaluation might begin with the development of a logic model that traces the connection 
between program goals, activities, and outcomes. See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR MEASURING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF EPA PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 8–11 (2006) (on file with authors). 
 101. See supra Part II.F and Tables 11–16. 
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the aggregational and inferential value of the data. Meeting these criteria may 
require mandating standard units and normalization factors as well as collecting 
data over time for both member facilities and, crucially, similar nonmember 
facilities. 
To measure progress toward social goals, ELPs have much more to do. 
Measuring improvements in multi-stakeholder relationships and changes in 
facility and agency culture requires defining and identifying relevant variables 
that measure the goals as closely as possible (a challenging task in itself), and 
then collecting quantitative or qualitative measures for these variables from 
member and nonmember facilities over time.102 The task may be difficult but it 
should not be impossible. Its completion is necessary to permit analysts to 
judge, with any degree of confidence, the effectiveness of these ELPs in terms 
of their social goals. 
To be sure, whether any particular program should engage in this data 
collection effort is another question entirely. It is true that program 
effectiveness cannot be determined without such an effort. But collecting the 
requisite data, particularly for the social goals, will likely be costly and time 
consuming. It may impose burdens on program members that could discourage 
participation in what are, after all, voluntary programs.103 Moreover, the 
conclusions from the resulting analysis may not end up being valuable or useful 
enough in terms of what agencies or the public would actually do with that 
information. Information collection has its own costs, and these costs may well 
not be justified in some cases, especially if the data will go unanalyzed or 
ignored. In this Article, we have indicated what needs to be done to determine 
better the effectiveness of ELPs, but the research we have undertaken cannot 
ultimately tell us whether it should be done. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, EPA and states have developed ELPs to address an 
array of environmental and social goals. Although many of these programs 
have been in place for five years or longer, little systematic research exists 
about their goals, operations, communications, and data collection practices. 
This Article, based on a review of program materials and interviews with key 
program managers, provides a descriptive account of the EPA’s Performance 
Track Program and the most longstanding ELPs in seventeen states. 
While improving environmental quality stands out as the most important 
goal of ELPs, a majority of the programs we studied reflected interest in 
achieving broader environmental and social goals as well. For ten of the 
eighteen programs, we found support for the goals of shifting the 
environmental performance curve, reducing costs, improving relationships, and 
 
 102. Borck, Coglianese, & Nash, supra note 97, at 10,699–701. 
 103. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 8, at 7. 
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changing culture at facilities and agencies. Although a majority of programs 
shared these broader goals, they were clearly secondary goals. Program 
documents infrequently mentioned them, and program officials rarely identified 
them as goals until we asked explicitly about them. 
Most program tiers required potential members to comply with 
environmental regulations, to have an EMS in place, and to set environmental 
performance goals. But those requirements were not maximally stringent. 
Typically, programs permitted minor episodes of noncompliance, and only a 
minority of programs required potential members to certify their EMSs through 
an independent audit. A few tiers, including some in the highest categories, did 
not require compliance with environmental regulations for continued 
membership. Moreover, a majority of program tiers, even at the highest levels, 
did not explicitly require that members demonstrate progress toward their 
commitments. 
Unlike members’ activities, programs were more uniform in the types of 
activities undertaken by the program staff themselves. All programs provided 
some type of incentive to members, and almost all programs facilitated 
information sharing and provided opportunities for members to interact with 
program officials and other stakeholders. 
Programs used various methods of communication and sometimes made 
facility performance data available to the public. A majority of programs issued 
press releases about members and posted at least some information about 
members on program websites. EPA and five states posted members’ 
applications and annual performance reports on their websites, and about one-
third published annual reports about the overall impact of their programs. 
We found that most program tiers in our sample collected highly relevant 
data to track the goal of improving the environment, and about half of the 
program tiers collected somewhat relevant data to track the goal of improving 
multi-stakeholder relationships and highly relevant data to track the goal of 
reducing costs for facilities and agencies. But, with the exception of EPA’s 
Performance Track, no programs collected data to measure the goals of 
changing facility and agency culture or of moving the environmental 
performance curve, even though both were identified as important goals by 
officials from a majority of the programs. In other words, the collection of 
environmental performance data was common, but the collection of measures 
of other stated goals of ELPs was infrequent or entirely nonexistent. 
Our study assessed several important characteristics of the data collected 
by programs to track progress toward their goals: the quality of the data, the 
aggregational value of the data, and the inferential value of the data. We used a 
simple but comprehensive rubric to assign a score of “high,” “medium,” or 
“low” on each characteristic to the data collected in support of each program 
goal by each program tier. Our assessment of programs’ data addressed 
whether the data collected by programs could be credibly used to analyze 
program effectiveness. 
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We found that the data collected exhibited reasonable quality, but usually 
possessed only limited aggregational and inferential value, and thus are of 
limited value in assessing program efficacy. On average, the data collected by 
programs scored “medium” on quality: most programs’ structures and designs 
provided some but not all potential safeguards for ensuring high-quality data. 
What the data sorely lacked, however, was aggregational and inferential value. 
Specifically, the data did not share critical features that would allow them to be 
added up across all members in a particular program tier and used in empirical 
analysis to assess program efficacy appropriately. There were exceptions; data 
from some programs or program tiers actually scored “high” or “medium” on 
all characteristics. On the whole, however, the data collected by programs in 
our sample cannot be credibly be used to assess most programs’ effectiveness. 
These general data weaknesses are significant, even surprising, given the 
aspirations for ELPs to facilitate policy learning and advocates’ claims that 
ELPs are delivering important environmental benefits.104 The reality is that 
governments have not been collecting the data needed to be able to determine 
whether ELPs are truly making a difference in achieving their goals. The mere 
fact that ELP members may have reported reductions in their environmental 
footprints does not answer the question of whether ELPs have caused these 
reductions. After all, businesses do have other reasons to go beyond 
compliance with existing environmental regulations, including the incentive to 
try to stave off future regulations.105 Some, if not all, of the environmental 
changes documented by ELPs may have occurred for other reasons. As such, 
the empirical inquiry we have provided in this Article charts the course for the 
kind of data collection and analysis that will be needed to understand whether 
ELPs truly cause positive change or are merely symbolic gestures distracting 
attention from the search for more meaningful solutions to today’s 
environmental problems. 
 
 104. See supra notes 19–22, 27 and accompanying text. See also EPA INNOVATION ACTION 
COUNCIL, EVERYDAY CHOICES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 14 (2005), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/NCEI/pdf/rpt2admin.pdf (noting that “EPA has used challenge 
programs successfully” including, in Performance Track, ”spurring environmental improvement on a 
facility-wide basis”). 
 105. See REINHARDT, supra note 45, at 11; THOMAS P. LYON & JOHN W. MAXWELL, CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 45–46 (2004) (presenting voluntary, beyond-compliance 
behavior “as a way to preempt the passage of new government regulations”). 
 
We welcome responses to this Article.  If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@ 
boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq. 
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APPENDIX I 
EPA’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK 
Established in 2000, Performance Track is considered one of EPA’s most 
prominent and extensive partnership programs. According to agency 
documents, the goals of the program are to deliver measurable environmental 
results, shift the environmental performance curve, and collaborate more 
effectively by “building partnerships, measuring results more systematically, 
and creating opportunities for more learning and sharing of information.” 
To qualify for membership in Performance Track, a facility must meet 
four criteria. It must: (1) have implemented an environmental management 
system (EMS), and the EMS must have been independently assessed; (2) have 
a record of sustained compliance with environmental laws and regulations; (3) 
demonstrate specific past environmental achievements and commit to achieving 
measurable environmental results that go beyond compliance; and (4) provide 
information to the local community on its environmental activities. 
To join Performance Track, a facility must complete an application that 
provides information about its size, sector, EMS, past achievements, future 
goals, and public outreach and reporting. A key component of the application is 
the section in which the facility describes its goals for improving its 
environmental performance in the future. Large facilities must establish four 
such goals in areas ranging from energy conservation to solid waste reduction, 
while small facilities need only establish two. A facility must also complete an 
“Environmental Requirements Checklist” indicating the environmental 
regulations to which it is subject. 
Once admitted, a facility must annually submit to EPA a performance 
report that provides detailed information about its progress toward meeting its 
commitments. EPA requires that facilities report on their progress in absolute 
terms (pounds of pollutant reduced) as well as on a normalized basis (pounds of 
pollutant reduced, taking into account changes in production). EPA recognizes 
Performance Track members as top performers, presents opportunities to 
interact with high-level EPA administrators, limits routine agency inspections, 
and offers a package of administrative and regulatory incentives. 
EPA posts members’ applications and annual performance reports on its 
website. In addition, it annually prepares a report that summarizes members’ 
contributions to environmental protection. According to a recent agency report, 
Performance Track members have collectively reduced the water they use by 
about 3.5 billion gallons. They have reduced greenhouse gas emissions by more 
than 97,000 tons and increased their use of recycled materials by 135,000 tons. 
They have also protected more than 14,000 acres of land. 
Membership in Performance Track currently stands at over 500 facilities 
from across a variety of industrial sectors and from nonprofit and governmental 
organizations. 
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APPENDIX II 
TABLES OF STATE PROGRAM DATA 
Table A-1. Programs in Our Sample 
 
 
 
Program 
Inception 
Number of 
Members 
(July 2007) 
Number of 
Tiers or 
Membership 
Levels 
FTEs 
Assigned 
to 
Program* 
United States EPA 
National Environmental 
Performance Track 
2000 450 1 19 
Colorado 
Environmental 
Leadership Program 
1998 30 3 1 
Georgia    
Partnership for a 
Sustainable Georgia 
2004, based 
on 1998 
program 
118 4 6 
Idaho    
GEMStars 
1998 20 3 2 
Louisiana    
Environmental 
Leadership Program 
2000 92 1 1 
Maine   
STEP-UP 
2000 13 3 0.5 
Michigan    
Clean Corporate Citizen 
1997 121 1 1.5 
Missouri    
Environmental 
Management 
Partnership 
2002 4 4 <1 
New Mexico    
Green Zia Environ-
mental Excellence 
Recognition Program 
1998 4 3 1 
North Carolina   
Environmental 
Stewardship Initiative 
2002 71 3 4.25 
Oklahoma    
Environmental 
Performance and 
Recognition Program 
2001 0 3 1 
Oregon 
Green Permits Program 
1999 3 3 0 
South Carolina    
Environmental 
Excellence Program 
1998 30 1 0.4 
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 Table A-1, continued.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A-2. Program Tiers and Tier Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Program 
Inception 
Number of 
Members  
(July 2007) 
Number of 
Tiers or 
Membership 
Levels 
FTEs 
Assigned 
to 
Program* 
Tennessee   
Pollution Prevention 
Partnership 
2000 613 4 4 
Texas    
Clean Texas 
1998 380 4 3 
Vermont   
Business Environmental 
Partnership 
1998 33 2 1 
Virginia 
Environmental 
Excellence Program 
2000 396 3 2 
Wisconsin 
Green Tier 
1995; 
relaunched 
in 2004 
11 2 4 
* FTE stands for “full-time equivalent”—essentially the number of full-time employees. 
Program and Tier or Membership 
Level Tier Type or Category 
Number of Members 
as of July 2007 
United States EPA Tracking 450 
Colorado     
Bronze Achiever On-Ramp 10 
Silver Partner Middle 0 
Gold Leader Tracking 20 
Georgia        
Champion Advocate 32 
Bronze On-Ramp 63 
Silver Middle 14 
Gold Stewardship 9 
Idaho        
Initial Tier On-Ramp 20 
Middle Tier Middle 0 
Highest Tier Middle 0 
Louisiana    Middle 92 
Maine       
Commitment Track Middle 1 
Leadership Track Middle/Tracking 12 
Sustainability Track Stewardship 0 
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Table A-2, continued. 
 
Program and Tier or Membership 
Level Tier Type or Category 
Number of Members 
as of July 2007 
Michigan    Middle/Tracking 121 
Missouri        
Partner Middle 0 
Certified Partner Middle 2 
Advanced Partner Tracking 1 
Certified Advanced Partner Tracking 0 
New Mexico        
Commitment Level On-Ramp 4 
Achievement Level Middle 0 
Environmental Excellence Award Tracking 0 
North Carolina       
Partner On-Ramp 52 
Rising Steward Middle/Tracking 13 
Steward Tracking/ Stewardship 6 
Oklahoma        
Commitment Level On-Ramp 0 
Achievement Level On-Ramp 0 
Excellence Level Middle 0 
Oregon     
Participant Middle 0 
Achiever Tracking 3 
Leader Stewardship 0 
South Carolina    On-Ramp/Middle 30 
Tennessee       
Prospect Level Advocate 418 
Pledge Level On-Ramp 181 
Partner Level Middle 30 
Performer Level Middle/Tracking 2 
Texas        
Bronze Member On-Ramp 263 
Silver Member Middle 0 
Gold Member Middle/Tracking 7 
Platinum Member Stewardship 10 
Vermont       
Environmental Partner Middle 31 
Environmental Leader Tracking 2 
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Table A-2, continued.  
 
Program and Tier or Membership 
Level Tier Type or Category 
Number of Members 
as of July 2007 
Virginia     
Environmental Enterprise (E2) Middle 250 
Exemplary Environmental 
Enterprise (E3) Middle 135 
Extraordinary Environmental 
Enterprise (E4) Tracking 11 
Wisconsin     
Tier 1 On-Ramp 10 
Tier 2 Middle 1 
 
Table A-3. Program Goals 
 
 Do Program Goals Include: 
 
 
Direct 
Environ-
mental 
Benefits 
Improvements 
in Multi-
Stakeholder 
Relationships 
Moving the 
Environmental 
Performance 
Curve 
Culture 
Change at 
Facilities 
and 
Agencies 
Cost 
Savings for 
Facilities 
and 
Agencies 
U.S. EPA Y(DM) Y(DM) Y(DM) Y(DP) Y(P) 
Colorado Y (DM) Y (P) N (D) Y (P) Y (P) 
Georgia    Y (DM) Y (M) Y (M) Y (D) Y (D) 
Idaho    Y (DM) N (P) Y (D), N (P) N (P) Y (M) 
Louisiana    Y (DM) N (P) N (P) N (P) Y (M) 
Maine    Y (DM) N (P) N (P) N (P) N (P) 
Michigan    Y (DM) N (D) N (D) Y (P) Y (DP) 
Missouri    Y (DM) Y (DM) Y (D), N (P) Y (DP) Y (DP) 
New 
Mexico    Y (DP) N (DP) N (DP) Y (P) N (DP) 
North 
Carolina   Y (D) Y (DP) Y (P) Y (P) 
Y (D), N 
(P) 
Oklahoma   Y (D) N (D) N (D) Y (D) N (D) 
Oregon Y (DM) Y (P) Y (P) Y (P) N (D) 
South 
Carolina    Y (DP) Y (P) Y (P) Y (P) N (P) 
Tennessee   Y (DM) Y (M) Y (P) Y (P) Y (P) 
Texas    Y (DM) Y (D), N (P) Y (P) Y (P) Y (P) 
Vermont   Y(DM) Y(P) Y(P) Y(P) Y(P) 
Virginia Y(DM) Y(P) Y(P) Y(P) Y(P) 
Wisconsin Y(DM) Y(DP) N(P) N(P) Y(DP) 
Key: D indicates information came from descriptive materials. M indicates that a program 
manager mentioned the information during the interview without a prompt from us. P 
indicates that a program manager mentioned the information during the interview following 
a prompt from us. 
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Table A-4.  Activities Required to Join Programs, by Program and Tier 
 
Requirements to Join Program Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
EMS 
Independent 
EMS 
Certification 
Environ. 
Performance 
Commit- 
ments 
Community 
Engagement 
Commit-
ments 
United States 
EPA Y Y Y Y Y 
Colorado           
Bronze Achiever Y N N N N 
Silver Partner Y N N Y N 
Gold Leader Y Y Y Y N 
Georgia              
Champion N N N N N 
Bronze N N N Y N 
Silver Y N N Y Y 
Gold Y Y Y Y Y 
Idaho              
Initial Tier Y N N Y N 
Middle Tier Y N N Y N 
Highest Tier Y N N Y N 
Louisiana    Y N N Y Y 
Maine             
Commitment 
Track Y Y Y Y N 
Leadership 
Track Y Y Y Y Y 
Sustainability 
Track Y Y Y Y Y 
Michigan    Y Y N Y N 
Missouri              
Partner Y Y N Y N 
Certified 
Partner Y Y Y Y N 
Advanced 
Partner Y Y N Y Y 
Certified 
Advanced 
Partner 
Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A-4, continued. 
 
Requirements to Join Program Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
EMS 
Independent 
EMS 
Certification 
Environ. 
Performance 
Commit-
ments 
Community 
Engagement 
Commit-
ments 
New Mexico              
Commitment 
Level N N N N N 
Achievement 
Level N Y N N N 
Environmental 
Excellence 
Award 
Y Y N N Y 
North Carolina             
Partner Y N N Y N 
Rising Steward Y Y Y Y N 
Steward Y Y Y Y Y 
Oklahoma              
Commitment 
Level Y N N Y N 
Achievement 
Level Y Y N Y N 
Excellence 
Level Y Y N Y N 
Oregon           
Participant Y Y N Y Y 
Achiever Y Y Y Y Y 
Leader Y Y Y Y Y 
South Carolina   Y Y N Y Y 
Tennessee             
Prospect Level N N N N N 
Pledge Level N N N Y N 
Partner Level Y N N Y N 
Performer Level Y Y N Y Y 
Texas              
Bronze Member Y N N Y Y 
Silver Member Y Y Y N N 
Gold Member Y Y Y Y Y 
Platinum 
Member Y Y Y Y Y 
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Table A-4, continued. 
 
Requirements to Join Program Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
EMS 
Independent 
EMS 
Certification 
Environ. 
Performance 
Commit-
ments 
Community 
Engagement 
Commit-
ments 
Vermont             
Environmental 
Partner N N N Y N 
Environmental 
Leader Y Y Y Y N 
Virginia           
Environmental 
Enterprise (E2) Y N N Y N 
Exemplary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E3) 
Y Y N Y N 
Extraordinary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E4) 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Wisconsin           
Tier 1 Y Y N Y N 
Tier 2 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Table A-5. Activities Required to Remain in Programs, by Program and 
Tier 
Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program 
Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
Maintain 
or 
Develop 
EMS 
Performance 
Reporting 
Progress 
Toward 
Achieving 
Commit-
ments 
Community 
Engagement 
United States 
EPA Y Y Y Y Y 
Colorado           
Bronze 
Achiever n/a N N   n/a N 
Silver Partner Y Y Y Y N 
Gold Leader Y Y Y Y N 
Georgia              
Champion N N Y N N 
Bronze Y Y Y N N 
Silver Y Y Y N Y 
Gold Y Y Y N Y 
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Table A-5, continued.  
 
Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program 
Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
Maintain 
or 
Develop 
EMS 
Performance 
Reporting 
Progress 
Toward 
Achieving 
Commit-
ments 
Community 
Engagement 
Idaho              
Initial Tier N N Y N/A N 
Middle Tier N N Y N/A N 
Highest Tier N N Y N/A N 
Louisiana    Y N Y N N 
Maine             
Commitment 
Track Y N Y N N 
Leadership 
Track Y N Y N N 
Sustainability 
Track Y  N Y N N 
Michigan    Y Y Y    N * N 
Missouri              
Partner Y Y Y Y N 
Certified 
Partner Y Y Y Y N 
Advanced 
Partner Y Y Y Y Y 
Certified 
Advanced 
Partner 
Y Y Y Y Y 
New Mexico              
Commitment 
Level 
Achievement 
Level 
Environmental 
Excellence 
Award 
Not Applicable. Facilities Apply Each Year. 
North 
Carolina             
Partner N Y Y N N 
Rising Steward N Y Y Y N 
Steward N Y Y Y Y 
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Table A-5, continued. 
 
Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program 
Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
Maintain 
or 
Develop 
EMS 
Performance 
Reporting 
Progress 
Toward 
Achieving 
Commit-
ments 
Community 
Engagement 
Oklahoma              
Commitment 
Level 
Achievement 
Level 
Excellence 
Level 
Information Not Available. 
Oregon           
Participant Y Y Y N Y 
Achiever Y Y Y N Y 
Leader Y Y Y N Y 
South 
Carolina    Y Y Y Y Y 
Tennessee             
Prospect Level N N N N N 
Pledge Level N N N N N 
Partner Level Y N Y    N * N 
Performer 
Level Y Y Y    N * Y 
Texas              
Bronze 
Member Y N Y N  Y 
Silver Member Y Y Y N  N 
Gold Member Y Y Y N  Y 
Platinum 
Member Y Y Y N Y 
Vermont             
Environmental 
Partner N N Y N N 
Environmental 
Leader Y Y Y N N 
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Table A-5, continued. 
 
Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Compliance 
with 
Regulations 
Maintain 
or 
Develop 
EMS 
Performance 
Reporting 
Progress 
Toward 
Achieving 
Commitments 
Community 
Engagement 
Virginia           
Environ. 
Enterprise 
(E2) 
Y Y Y N N 
Exemplary 
Environ. 
Enterprise 
(E3) 
Y Y Y N Y 
Extraordinary 
Environ. 
Enterprise 
(E4) 
Y Y Y N Y 
Wisconsin           
Tier 1 Y Y Y N N 
Tier 2 Y Y Y Y Y 
* In each of these cases, we received conflicting information from different sources. In Table 
7, we counted each of these as one-half “yes” and one-half “no.”  
 
Table A-6. Program Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Does the Program Offer: 
 
Opportunities to Interact 
with Representatives of 
Government, Other 
Firms, and the 
Community 
Mentoring Incentives to Members 
Information 
Sharing 
United 
States EPA Y Y Y Y 
Colorado Y Y Y Y 
Georgia    Y Y Y Y 
Idaho    Y Y Y Y 
Louisiana    Y N Y Y 
Maine   Y Y Y Y 
Michigan    Y N Y Y 
Missouri    Y N Y Y 
New 
Mexico    Y Y Y Y 
North 
Carolina   Y Y Y Y 
Oklahoma    N  N Y Y 
Oregon N  N Y N 
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Table A-6, continued.  
 
 Does the Program Offer: 
 
Opportunities to Interact 
with Representatives of 
Government, Other 
Firms, and the 
Community 
Mentoring Incentives to Members 
Information 
Sharing 
South 
Carolina    Y Y Y Y 
Tennessee   Y Y Y Y 
Texas       N *    N * Y Y 
Vermont   Y Y Y Y 
Virginia Y N Y Y 
Wisconsin Y N Y Y 
* In each of these cases, we received conflicting information from different sources. In 
Figure 2, we counted each of these as one-half “yes” and one-half “no.” 
 
Table A-7. Program Communication Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Does the Program Communicate its Results Thorough: 
 
Annual Reports 
About the 
Program Posted 
on Website 
Information on 
Individual 
Members Posted 
on Website 
Public 
Meetings 
Press 
Releases 
United States 
EPA Y Y Y Y 
Colorado N Y N Y 
Georgia    N Y Y Y 
Idaho    N Y N Y 
Louisiana       Y *    Y * N Y 
Maine   N N N Y 
Michigan    Y Y N N 
Missouri    N Y N N 
New Mexico    Y Y N Y 
North Carolina   Y Y Y Y 
Oklahoma    N N N N 
Oregon N Y N N 
South Carolina    N N Y Y 
Tennessee   N Y Y Y 
Texas    N N Y Y 
Vermont   N N Y Y 
Virginia Y N Y Y 
Wisconsin Y Y Y Y 
* In each of these cases, we received conflicting information from different sources.  In 
Figure 3, we counted each of these as one-half "yes" and one-half "no." 
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Table A-8. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of 
"Direct Environmental Benefits" 
 
Goal: Direct Environmental Benefits Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
United States 
EPA H H H M H 
Colorado           
Bronze Achiever H L L L L 
Silver Partner H M L L L 
Gold Leader H H H M L 
Georgia              
Champion n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Bronze H M M L H 
Silver H M H M H 
Gold H H H M H 
Idaho              
Initial Tier H M L L M 
Middle Tier H M L L M 
Highest Tier H M L L M 
Louisiana    H L L L L 
Maine             
Commitment 
Track H M M M L 
Leadership 
Track H M M M L 
Sustainability 
Track H M M M L 
Michigan    H M L M M 
Missouri              
Partner H H M M M 
Certified 
Partner H H M M M 
Advanced 
Partner H H M M M 
Certified 
Advanced 
Partner 
H H M M M 
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Table A-8, continued. 
 
Goal: Direct Environmental Benefits 
Program and Tier 
or Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
New Mexico              
Commitment 
Level H L L L M 
Achievement 
Level H M L M M 
Environmental 
Excellence 
Award 
H M L M M 
North Carolina             
Partner H M H M M 
Rising Steward H H H M M 
Steward H H H M M 
Oklahoma              
Commitment 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Achievement 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Excellence Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Oregon           
Participant H H L M H 
Achiever H H L M H 
Leader H H L M H 
South Carolina    H M L L L 
Tennessee             
Prospect Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Pledge Level H L L L L 
Partner Level H M L L M 
Performer Level H H L L H 
Texas              
Bronze Member H M H M L 
Silver Member H H H M L 
Gold Member H H H M L 
Platinum 
Member H H H M L 
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 Table A-8, continued. 
 
Goal: Direct Environmental Benefits Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
Vermont             
Environmental 
Partner H M M L L 
Environmental 
Leader H H M L L 
Virginia           
Environmental 
Enterprise (E2) H M H M L 
Exemplary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E3) 
H H H M L 
Extraordinary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E4) 
H H H M L 
Wisconsin           
Tier 1 H M L L H 
Tier 2 H H L L H 
Key: “H” indicates “high,” our top score in a category. “M” indicates “medium.” “L” 
indicates “low,” our bottom score in a category. “n/a” indicates not applicable.  
 
Table A-9. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of 
"Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships"  
 
Goal: Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
United States 
EPA M M L L H 
Colorado           
Bronze Achiever n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Silver Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Gold Leader M M L L L 
Georgia              
Champion M M M L H 
Bronze n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Silver M H M L H 
Gold M H M L H 
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Table A-9, continued. 
 
Goal: Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
Idaho              
Initial Tier n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Middle Tier n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Highest Tier n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Louisiana    n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Maine             
Commitment 
Track n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Leadership 
Track n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sustainability 
Track n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Michigan    n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Missouri              
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Certified 
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Advanced 
Partner M M M M M 
Certified 
Advanced 
Partner 
M M M M M 
New Mexico              
Commitment 
Level L L L L M 
Achievement 
Level L L L L M 
Environmental 
Excellence 
Award 
L L L L M 
North Carolina             
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rising Steward n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Steward L M M L M 
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Table A-9, continued. 
 
Goal: Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
Oklahoma              
Commitment 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Achievement 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Excellence Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Oregon           
Participant M H L L H 
Achiever M H L L H 
Leader M H L L H 
South Carolina    M M L L L 
Tennessee             
Prospect Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Pledge Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Partner Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Performer Level M H L L M 
Texas              
Bronze Member M M M L L 
Silver Member n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Gold Member M H M L L 
Platinum 
Member M H M L L 
Vermont             
Environmental 
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Environmental 
Leader n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Virginia           
Environmental 
Enterprise (E2) M L L L L 
Exemplary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E3) 
M M L L L 
Extraordinary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E4) 
M M L L L 
Wisconsin           
Tier 1 M L L L H 
Tier 2 M L L L H 
Key: “H” indicates “high,” our top score in a category. “M” indicates “medium.” “L” 
indicates “low,” our bottom score in a category. “n/a” indicates not applicable. 
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 Table A-10. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of 
"Cost Savings for Facilities and Agencies"  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal: Cost Savings for Facilities and Agencies Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
United States 
EPA n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Colorado           
Bronze Achiever n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Silver Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Gold Leader n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Georgia              
Champion n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Bronze n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Silver H L M L H 
Gold           
Idaho              
Initial Tier H M M L M 
Middle Tier H M M L M 
Highest Tier H M M L M 
Louisiana    H L M L L 
Maine             
Commitment 
Track n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Leadership 
Track n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sustainability 
Track n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Michigan    H M M L L 
Missouri              
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Certified 
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Advanced 
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Certified 
Advanced 
Partner 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
New Mexico         
Commitment 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Achievement 
Level H M M L M 
Environmental 
Excellence 
Award 
H M M L M 
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Table A-10, continued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goal: Cost Savings for Facilities and Agencies Program and 
Tier or 
Membership 
Level 
Data 
Relevance 
Data 
Quality 
Aggregational 
Value 
Inferential 
Value 
Data 
Accessibility 
N. Carolina             
Partner n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rising Steward H H M L L 
Steward H H M L L 
Oklahoma              
Commitment 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Achievement 
Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Excellence Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Oregon           
Participant n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Achiever n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Leader n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
S. Carolina    n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tennessee             
Prospect Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Pledge Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Partner Level n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Performer Level H L M L M 
Texas              
Bronze Member H L M M L 
Silver Member H L M M L 
Gold Member H L M M L 
Platinum 
Member H L M M L 
Vermont             
Environmental 
Partner H L M L L 
Environmental 
Leader H L M L L 
Virginia           
Environmental 
Enterprise (E2) H L M L L 
Exemplary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E3) 
H L M L L 
Extraordinary 
Environmental 
Enterprise (E4) 
H L M L L 
Wisconsin           
Tier 1 H L M L H 
Tier 2 H L M L H 
Key: “H” indicates “high,” our top score in a category. “M” indicates “medium.” “L” 
indicates “low,” our bottom score in a category. “n/a” indicates not applicable. 
 
